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The limits of administrative law are undergoing a seismic shift in the im-
migration arena. Chevron divides interpretive and decision-making authority
between the federal courts and agencies in each of two steps. The Supreme
Court may now be transforming this division in largely unrecognized ways. These
shifts, currently playing out in the immigration context, may threaten to re-
shape deference jurisprudence by handing more power to the immigration
agency just when the agency may be least able to handle that power effectively.
An unprecedented surge in immigration cases—now approximately 90% of
the federal administrative docket—has arrived just as the Court is whittling
away the judicial role while expanding agency authority, significantly trans-
forming traditional deference doctrine. In its immigration docket, the Court
is shifting the judicial role away from questions of statutory interpretation
and towards a mere evaluation of when the agency’s interpretation should be
granted deference. Assessment of the “reasonableness” of the agency’s
action has given way to marking the outer boundaries of agency action,
merging the court’s traditional oversight analysis into a form of “arbitrary
and capriciousness” review.
The costs of the Court’s reformulation of Chevron are particularly visible
in immigration law because recent legislation and structural changes at the
immigration agency have already constrained judicial review. However, the
reformulation of Chevron occurring in immigration law may threaten to
remake administrative law generally. Unfortunately, these developments
have received little scholarly attention. Understanding this transformation is
imperative as ultimately we may be heading towards “Chevron without the
Courts”—wherein the judicial interpretive role is being constrained in the
very instances where agencies are least able to function effectively.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank Afra
Afsharipour, Maxwell Chibundu, Gabriel J. Chin, Danielle Citron, David Gamage, Smriti Rana,
Ediberto Roman, Robert Percival, Amanda Pustilnik, Christopher Rickerd, Rick Su, David Super,
Rose Villazor, Jarrod Wong, Greg Young, and the participants in the Conference of Asian Pacific
American Law Faculty (CAPALF)/Western Law Teachers of Color (WLTC) Workshop, the Southeast-
ern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) New Scholars Workshop, and the faculty workshops of the
University of Maryland and William and Mary Law Schools for their many helpful comments. I also
wish to thank Christopher Gray, Dhanya John, Eric Kunimoto, and Jennifer Thompson for their
excellent research assistance. © 2013, Shruti Rana.
313
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
I. WHY WE NEED THE COURTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
II. DO WE HAVE THE COURTS? THE CONTRACTION OF THE JUDICIAL
ROLE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
A. The Evolution of the Judicial Interpretive Role: The
Courts’ Authority to Say What the “Law” Is . . . . . . . . . . 334
B. Chevron and its Impact on the Judicial Role in Statutory
Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
III. LOOKING THROUGH AN IMMIGRATION LENS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
ON RECENT CHEVRON JURISPRUDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
A. What Can an Immigration Lens Contribute? . . . . . . . . . . 343
B. What Immigration Cases Reveal About the Marginaliza-
tion of the Judicial Interpretive Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
1. A Far From Ordinary “Remand Rule” . . . . . . . . . . . 349
2. Collapsing the Judicial Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
3. Furthering Chevron’s Collapse into a Single Step . . . 353
C. Implications for Non-Immigration Administrative Law. . . 356
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
INTRODUCTION
One of the primary battlegrounds in administrative law centers on the
balance of powers between federal courts and agencies. Courts and agencies
have long been viewed as having complementary roles in statutory interpre-
tation that reflect their particular institutional competencies and traditional
legal prerogatives.1 In its seminal 1984 Chevron decision, the Supreme Court
attempted to set forth a framework clarifying these roles, dividing interpre-
tive and decision-making authority between the courts and agencies with a
1. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 611
(2009) (discussing Chevron’s task allocation function and utility as a framework for circumscribing
the appropriate scope of independent judicial decision making, arguing that Chevron’s framework “is
best understood as a framework for allocating interpretive authority in the administrative state” by
separating “those questions of statutory implementation assigned to independent judicial judgment
(Step One) from those regarding which courts’ role is limited to oversight of agency decision making
(Step Two)”).
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two-step framework.2 In Step One, a reviewing court is to ask whether a
statute is ambiguous, and if so, the court in Step Two is to determine whether
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable enough to receive deference.3
Despite the apparent clarity of this framework,4 the high stakes in many
interpretive problems5 have spawned enormous debate regarding how to
apply this framework.6 As a result, the boundary between agency and judicial
power in statutory interpretation continues to see much contention and
dissent.7
Over the last decade, these debates have taken on a new urgency and
2. In Chevron, the Supreme Court initially attempted to address this issue by explaining that
ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority by
Congress to agencies to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable fashion. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). It sought to delineate the areas of discretionary authority left
to the agencies and to the courts by setting forth a two-step framework. In step one, Chevron
instructed the federal courts that their role was to determine whether a statute was ambiguous; if so,
and the agency’s construction of that statute was reasonable, then the federal court was required to
defer to and accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s interpretation
differed from what the court believed to be the best statutory interpretation (step two). In this manner,
Chevron gave both the federal courts and agencies a role in interpreting statutes. See also Nat’l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005).
3. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 1, at 620 (citing a recent case, Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006), where the Court employed language suggesting a unitary Chevron standard).
4. See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (“[Chevron]
is oft-cited and provides a useful and convenient ‘test’ for judges and lawyers because it created a
simple roadmap for analyzing the complex mysteries of how courts should defer to administrative
agencies when construing statues. Chevron is not merely a useful citation, rhetorical resource or
codification, but instead is an important paradigm-shifting case that re-conceptualized the relative
roles of courts and agencies when construing statutes over which agencies have been given
interpretive rights.”).
5. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Argument Preview: Calculating Relief from Removal, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 13, 2012, 11:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/argument-preview-calculating-relief-
from-removal/ (“As always in immigration law, the stakes are high—the interpretation of a complex
statute will decide whether individuals with close connections to the United States since childhood
will be forced to leave and separate from their families.”); see also Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917,
927-28 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting “[t]he liberty interests involved in removal proceedings are of the
highest order. Removal ‘visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him [or her] of the right
to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.’ It is ‘a drastic measure’ and for some ‘the
equivalent of banishment or exile.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). See also John R.
Mills et al., Death is Different and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361, 385
(2009) (“Deportation, particularly if it is permanent, amounts to punishment.”).
6. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 4, at 3 (describing Chevron as “notorious”); Elizabeth V. Foote,
Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of
Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 719 (2007) (discussing the “persistent doctrinal
confusion” stemming from Chevron); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards,
Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 809 (2002) (“Chevron, of course, is the
Court’s most important decision about the most important issue in modern administrative law . . . .”).
See also Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (2007) (describing the vast
body of scholarship Chevron has generated).
7. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1097
(2008) (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions which “suggest that there are many issues
Chevron left unresolved” including a number of doctrinal questions such as whether there is some
kind of “super-deference [involved] when agencies are interpreting their own prior regulations or
acting on foreign affairs or national security matters”); see also id. at 1156-57 (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s deference doctrine is complicated as a matter of theory and chaotic as a matter of
practice . . . . In short, the Supreme Court’s deference jurisprudence is a mess.”).
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vitality as some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court has been re-
formulating the Chevron doctrine.8 Regardless of whether or not the Supreme
Court is actually in the process of reformulating Chevron generally, this
article argues that the Supreme Court is clearly revising Chevron within the
immigration context. Moreover, these revisions are occurring just as the im-
migration agency has fallen into crisis,9 opening an interesting analytical space.
Taking the general debates over Chevron as a starting point, recent cases
have added to, rather than detracted from, the confusion over the distinctions
between Chevron’s two steps and how they should be applied. Some scholars
argue that Chevron’s two steps must be sharpened to avoid agencies usurping
the independent judicial role.10 Others argue that Chevron’s two steps should
be conceptually collapsed into one step alone—a single inquiry into the
reasonableness of the agency’s statutory interpretation.11
Amidst a torrent of cases developing and applying deference law, two
themes stand out. First, in a line of cases culminating in United States v.
Mead Corp.,12 the Supreme Court has denied Chevron deference to low-
quality agency decisions—those rendered by junior officials without going
through processes that might be expected to produce thoughtful, well-
reasoned decisions. This can be seen as an extension of a line of cases
limiting the delegation of particularly sensitive powers to low-ranking
bodies.13 The demand for quality manifested in the Mead line of cases can be
seen as shifting the limits of interpretive power in favor of the courts and
against the agencies.
8. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congres-
sional Intent, Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783 (2007).
9. See Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on America’s Asylum
System, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2007) (“That the American Asylum system has fallen into
disrepute is no longer a significantly contested point of debate.”). See also Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 459, 475 (2006) (noting that the brevity of agency review has led immigration lawyers and
federal judges to view BIA decision making as “deeply troubled”).
10. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 1.
11. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV.
597 (2009). See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1088 (“Since Cardoza-Fonseca, there has
been a doctrinal tug of war within the Supreme Court between Justices Stevens (Chevron’s author)
and Scalia (the cheerleader for a broad reading).”); see also Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 1, at
614-15 (discussing divergent views).
12. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). See also Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (‘“[R]easonableness . . . is to be determined by reference both to the agency’s textual
analysis (broadly defined, including where appropriate resort to legislative history) and to the
compatibility of that interpretation with the Congressional purposes informing the measure. The
latter aspect of the reasonableness inquiry, for reasons that we shall presently state, is the more
difficult and sensitive half of our Chevron Step Two exercise.”).
13. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (denying the
municipality the authority to make a finding of past racial discrimination sufficient to justify
race-conscious remedies); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)
(refusing to extend states’ plenary antitrust exemption to municipalities); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (denying the Civil Service Commission the authority to make constitution-
ally sensitive decisions to bar legal immigrants from government service); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958) (denying the State Department authority to deny a passport to a U.S. citizen absent clear
congressional authorization).
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Just a few years after Mead, however, the Court elevated agencies’ status
in the process of statutory construction in the Brand X case.14 Brand X
entitles agencies to disregard judicial constructions of statutes and re-
quires courts to yield to agencies’ interpretations in preference to the courts’
own precedents if the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpreta-
tion is reasonable. In such cases, the Court came close to declaring that
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the [agency] to say what the law
is.”15
Although not directly contradictory, these two lines of cases certainly
move in opposite directions and imply significantly different views of the
relative strengths and proper powers of agencies and courts. On the one hand,
we are told to suspect the quality of agencies’ decision making, while on the
other we are told to prefer it to that of the courts and the values of stare
decisis. Moreover, both of the key decisions in these lines commanded large
majorities on the Court (although in each case with Justice Scalia in dissent).
Not surprisingly, scholars have split wildly as to what these cases tell us
about the Court’s trajectory on deference to administrative interpretations.16
The most straightforward synthesis of these two lines of cases is to see
them as focusing on the quality of an agency’s decision making. When an
agency speaks through junior officials using casual procedures, the resulting
decision is entitled to only as much deference as its persuasive value merits.17
Thus, when the Social Security Administration failed to follow the proce-
dures Mead identified as indicating the appropriateness of deference, but
nevertheless issued thoughtful and consistent guidance from its central office
to thousands of administrative law judges and claims representatives around
the country, the Court was happy to defer only because the agency reached a
clearly thoughtful decision.18 Yet where an agency brings its resources fully
to bear in making a decision, Brand X presumes that this decision will be
sufficiently superior to what generalist judges can achieve so as to warrant
14. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
15. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (using the quoted language to
claim that power for “the judicial department” of the federal government).
16. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 6; Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X Liberation: Doing Away with
Chevron’s Second Step as Well as Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 167-68
(2010). See also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing
Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105 (2001). Compare Ronald
M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1997)
(noting that the District of Columbia Circuit “has been especially puzzled about the relationship
between step two and the traditional ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test prescribed in § 706(2)(A) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’)”), with Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating
Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 210-12 (1992) (arguing
that the judicial review articulated in step two applies only when agency interpretations in question
were made with a clear delegation of authority from Congress).
17. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Mead directs courts to apply Skidmore to
agency interpretations that lack the procedures or clear delegations that would earn them Chevron
deference.
18. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002).
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overriding prior judicial constructions.19 That is, a responsible agency should
bring to bear “the credibility of their circumstances, [and also] contribute to
an efficient, predictable, and nationally uniform understanding of the law that
would be disrupted by the variable results to be expected from a geographi-
cally and politically diverse judiciary encountering the hardest (that is to say,
the most likely to be litigated) issues with little experience of the overall
scheme and its patterns.”20
Under this synthesis, one might presume that an agency whose decision-
making processes are rapidly decaying, one that is increasingly unable to
produce coherent decisions, much less high-quality ones, would receive little
or no deference from the courts for its statutory constructions. Thus, as the
Board of Immigration Appeals21 buckles under a mammoth caseload, replac-
ing three-judge panels with single judges, commonly issuing one-line sum-
mary affirmances of immigration judges’ decisions (decisions which are
themselves coming from a geographically and politically dispersed group of
immigration judges) without either endorsing those judges’ rationales or
suggesting alternatives, and issuing opinions that federal appellate judges
across the political and jurisprudential spectrum have found indefensible,22
one might imagine that the courts would feel entitled to construe the
immigration statutes virtually de novo.23 Under the behavioralist interpreta-
tion of Mead, this might then prompt the Board to improve its processes, to
the benefit of all concerned, so that the courts might grant it a greater say in
the laws under which it operates.24
In practice, the result has been just the opposite. In its recent immigration
jurisprudence, the Court has increasingly tilted the balance of power towards
19. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); see
also Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. F.C.C., 649 F.3d 695, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Los
Angeles v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 165 F.3d 972, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“In reviewing the
[Commission’s] order, we do not sit as a panel of referees on a professional economics journal, but as
a panel of generalist judges obliged to defer to a reasonable judgment by an agency acting pursuant to
congressionally delegated authority.”) (alteration in original)).
20. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012).
21. The Board of Immigration Appeals and Immigration Judges are located within the Depart-
ment of Justice. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOARD
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL app. C (2004) [hereinafter EOIR ORGANIZATIONAL
CHART] (providing an organizational chart demonstrating the relationship between the relevant
agencies).
22. See, e.g., Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2007); Benslimane v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).
23. See Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 976 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Questions of law and constitutional
questions are subject to de novo review, with deference to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the
statutes and regulations.” (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005))).
24. See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 932-33 (2008) (stating that data and analysis
regarding agency rulemaking set forth in the article “provides some support for the conclusion that
agencies’ use of notice-and-comment rulemaking increased after the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision
in United States v. Mead Corporation”).
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the agency by limiting judicial interpretive authority in favor of agency
deference,25 while the agency itself has fallen into further disrepair.26
Housed within the Department of Justice, the Executive Office for Immi-
gration Review [hereinafter “the immigration agency”] is charged with the
momentous task of adjudicating asylum claims and determining whether
foreign-born individuals charged with violating immigration law “should be
ordered removed from the United States or should be granted relief or
protection from removal and be permitted to remain in this country.”27 Yet
this agency, responsible for deciding the fate of people facing deportation, is
beset with so many severe problems—from overburdened courts and an
enormous backlog of cases,28 to charges of bias,29 to endemic mistakes,30 to
widely inconsistent decision making31—“[t]hat the American asylum system
has fallen into disrepute is no longer a significantly contested point of
debate.”32
25. See, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009);
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002).
26. See Walker, supra note 9, at 2. See also Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum
Seekers: Why the Real ID Act is a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 142 (2006) (noting that
the Real ID Act weakens an already “broken asylum system”).
27. See 6 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (2006) (“There is in the Department of Justice the Executive Office
of Immigration Review, which shall be subject to the direction and regulation of the Attorney General
under section 1103(g) of title 8.”). The Executive Office of Immigration review contains 59
immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals responsible for adjudicating and reviewing
deportation decisions. EOIR at a Glance, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE—EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRA-
TION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/EOIRataGlance09092010.htm. See also Lenni
B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Enhancing Quality and Timeliness in Immigration Removal
Adjudication, at 5-11 (Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Enhancing-
Quality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf.
28. Benson & Wheeler, supra note 27. The adjudicatory branch of the immigration agency is
inundated with immigration appeals, severely straining its resources. Id. For example, the EXECUTIVE
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at Y1-Y2 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy11syb.pdf, shows that a total of 297,848 immigration court
cases and 30,350 BIA cases were pending as of September 30, 2011. This represents a rise in
immigration court cases pending since the previous year.
29. See infra note 67. Both the immigration courts and the federal courts where agency appeals
are appealed have been presented with an unprecedented wave of immigration cases. Benson &
Wheeler, supra note 27. See also the EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2010
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at Y1-Y2 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.
pdf (showing that a total of 262,622 immigration court cases and 30,112 BIA cases were pending as of
September 30, 2010) and Executive Office for Immigration Review, supra note 28, at Y1-Y2
(showing that a total of 297,848 immigration court cases and 30,350 BIA cases were pending as of
September 30, 2011, a significant rise from the year before).
30. See infra note 104.
31. See infra part I. See also Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts, FY
2007-2012, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/306/include/denialrates.html
(last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (depicting rates of asylum denials by Immigration Judge from 2007-2012
and noting inconsistencies in decision making).
32. Walker, supra note 9, at 2. Significantly, these problems have now spread and possibly
infected Supreme Court adjudication. In an April 2009 immigration opinion, Nken v. Holder, the
Court relied on representations by the Justice Department, specifically by the Solicitor General’s
office, that the United States had a “policy and practice” of helping deported aliens who were cleared
for return and restoring them to their prior status. Jess Bravin, Judge Suggests U.S. Misled Court on
Immigration Policy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2012, at A6. However, recently a federal judge has charged
that the Solicitor General’s office had not produced documents showing this policy existed.
Immigrant advocacy groups also claimed they did not know of this policy. If these charges prove true,
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This article conducts an in-depth analysis of the Court’s recent immigra-
tion jurisprudence, an area where the Court appears to be experimenting with
Chevron in ways that have largely gone unrecognized. Discerning what the
Court is doing in recent immigration cases may prove crucial to understand-
ing the future course of administrative law generally. For at least four
decades, environmental cases provided the platforms for many of the Court’s
most important decisions shaping administrative law.33 Today, however,
immigration cases dominate the administrative law dockets of the federal
courts of appeal and are becoming increasingly prominent in the Court’s own
docket.34 With the immigration statutes a tangled web of often contradictory
edicts, often drafted hurriedly35—and with the political process deadlocked
to the point that legislative clarification may be a long time coming36—these
this will be yet another indication that deference should not be assumed in the case of the immigration
agency. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1112 (noting that the Supreme Court often relies on
briefs from the Solicitor General’s office).
33. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See also Elliott, supra note 4 (discussing the strong
impact Chevron has had on environmental law); Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of
Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 771 (2008) (“Strong synergies exist between environmental law and
administrative law. While Chevron creates the standard for deference to administrative agencies, it
also is an important case in environmental law. In addition, environmental cases play a major role in
administrative law casebooks and in developing the processes under which courts review all agency
decisions.”).
34. See COMMERCIAL & FED. LITIGATION SECTION, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
CONTINUING SURGE IN IMMIGRATION APPEALS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT: THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE
FUTURE 10 (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders4/Commercialand
FederalLitigationSection/ComFedReports/ImmigrationAppealsinthe2dCircuitFinalReport1-29-
10.pdf (“Immigration appeals have represented between 37% and 39% percent of all appeals filed
within the Second Circuit between 2004 and 2008. By contrast, only 4% of the Second Circuit’s
docket consisted of BIA cases in 2001.” (internal citations omitted)); Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper
Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration
Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 47 n.34 (2006–2007) (pointing out that
immigration cases made up nearly 90% of all administrative appeals heard in the federal courts of
appeals); Note, Recent Cases: Immigration Law-Administrative Adjudication—Third and Seventh
Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration Courts—Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F.3d 260
(3d Cir. 2005) and Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2596,
2596 (2006) (noting that immigration appeals have “swollen in the past five years from three percent
to eighteen percent of all federal appeals”); James Warren, Not Mincing Words over Asylum, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at A21B (noting “a sharp increase in immigration caseloads and other matters
winding up before appeals courts”).
35. See Darren H. Weiss, Note, X Misses the Spot: Fernandez v. Keisler and the (Mis)Appropria-
tion of Brand X by the Board of Immigration Appeals, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 890 (2010)
(“Congressional decision making and resulting legislation are certainly not models of clarity. When
Congress enacts legislation, it leaves out certain minutiae—sometimes purposely, other times not.”).
36. Interactions between the judiciary and Congress on immigration matters are frequently
politicized. For example, a former Department of Justice liaison to the White House, Monica
Goodling, testified before Congress that the Bush administration’s hiring policy of immigration
judges was based on political ties and ideological beliefs, not experience in the immigration field. See
OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 110-11, 116 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/
s0807/final.pdf; Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635
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cases have provided an attractive vehicle for the Court to experiment with
new approaches to judicial review. Understanding the techniques the Court
has deployed not just to evade its own Mead standard, but also to marginalize
courts far more thoroughly than the Chevron two-step formula suggests, may
provide a preview of changes that could affect judicial review of administra-
tive decisions more generally.
The significance of this analysis is underscored by several simultaneously
occurring phenomena. First, there is at least some evidence that federal
immigration jurisprudence may be infecting non-immigration administrative
law cases, as the Chevron analyses in immigration cases may be starting to
take hold in non-immigration administrative law decisions.37 Second, supple-
menting this trend, scholars are beginning to recognize that the Court may be
dramatically shifting its treatment of immigration cases with respect to a
broad range of issues—not just with respect to deference.38 The Court
appears to be moving away from what has been called “immigration
exceptionalism”39 and is instead increasingly placing immigration cases into
a larger public law framework. In other words, the Court appears to be
moving immigration cases more firmly into the mainstream of administrative
law.40 Third, all of these developments are occurring against a dramatic
(2010) (noting criticisms of the politicization of the immigration process are well-founded)
[hereinafter Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication]; Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias
and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417 (2011); see also Legomsky, supra, at 1637 (“The
labyrinth known as the Immigration and Nationality Act governs the admission . . . to [and] expulsion
from the United States . . . Its five hundred pages conspire with more than one thousand pages of
administrative regulations issued by a variety of federal departments, as well as precedent decisions
of administrative tribunals, executive officers, and courts, to create a byzantine network of
substantive and procedural areas of law.” (footnote omitted)).
37. See, e.g., W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 530 F.3d 1186, 1201 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Gonzales v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 508 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2007)) (energy case citing
immigration case); Fort Independence Indian Cmty. v. California, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D.
Cal. 2009) (citing Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009)) (Native
American/Gaming case citing immigration case regarding Chevron and Skidmore deference); Sash v.
Zenk, 428 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000), in
discussion on the application of deference to Bureau of Prisons on the issue of time off for good
behavior).
38. Traditionally, the view of scholars has been that “[f]or the most part, the Supreme Court has
not applied to immigration cases the constitutional norms familiar in other areas of public law.”
Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 937 (1995). However, more recently scholars have been identifying
immigration law as a species of administrative law. See Lenni B. Benson, The Search for Fair Agency
Process: The Immigration Opinions of Judge Michael Daly Hawkins 1994-2010, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 7,
10 (2011); Brian R. Gallini & Elizabeth L. Young, Car Stops, Borders, and Profiling: The Hunt for
Undocumented (Illegal?) Immigrants in Border Towns, 89 NEB. L. REV. 709, 724 n.91 (2011); see
also Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV.
565, 566 (2012) (“Immigration law can seem to be in its own world, divorced from the evolution of
important legal concepts. But this Article finds immigration law in step with administrative law
regarding a major topic: nonlegislative rules.”).
39. See Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exception-
alism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) (defining immigration exceptionalism as the view that
immigration and alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on government decision
making—for example, judicial review).
40. Id.
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backdrop—that is, the Court is increasingly tilting the balance of power
towards the immigration agency, by limiting judicial interpretive authority in
favor of agency deference,41 at the same time that the immigration agency is
falling further into chaos.42
This article seeks to contribute a new doctrinal perspective on this sharply
debated administrative law issue by analyzing recent Chevron jurisprudence,
and the far-reaching implications of this jurisprudence, through an immigra-
tion lens. While many scholars have examined the impact of federal courts on
immigration law,43 this article reverses this often-used framework and
analyzes the consequences of the recent unprecedented surge in immigration
cases for their possible doctrinal impact on administrative law. This article
argues that recent Supreme Court cases applying Chevron in the immigration
context—which have been little-analyzed by administrative law scholars,
even though immigration cases now make up the majority of federal court
administrative law cases44—reveal that the Court has recently significantly
altered the boundaries between courts and agencies set forth in Chevron,
shifting interpretive power to the immigration agency and limiting courts’
role to that of oversight of the boundaries of agency interpretation. In other
words, the Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence demonstrates that the
debate over whether and how the judicial interpretive role should be limited
may have already largely been resolved—the Court has eroded the judicial
role in statutory interpretation into a mere oversight function and thereby
greatly expanded the agency’s domain, at least in the immigration context,
and potentially portending changes in administrative laws more generally.
This article further argues that this expansion of the agency’s role has gone
beyond what Chevron may have originally intended, that—at least in the
immigration context—Chevron’s focus on deference has now been sharpened
to the extreme. Thus, this article seeks to demonstrate some of the potential
dangers of expanding an agency’s interpretive domain at the expense of the
courts by analyzing how this expansion is playing out in the immigration
realm. Beginning in approximately 2001—just when the Court was increas-
ing the scope of the immigration agency’s authorities at the expense of the
courts—the immigration agency began its own far-reaching transformation
that ultimately led to the immigration agency falling into crisis.45
41. See, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009);
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002).
42. See Walker, supra note 9, at 2. See also Cianciarulo, supra note 26, at 142 (noting that the
Real ID Act weakens an already “broken asylum system”).
43. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 34; Legomsky, Immigration Adjudication, supra note 36.
44. See Michael M. Hethmon, Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining
Reforms and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 999, 1002 (2006); Benson,
supra note 34, at 47 n.34.
45. See Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNVEILS ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE CHANGE TO BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE MASSIVE BACKLOG OF
MORE THAN 56,000 CASES (Feb. 6, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/February/02_ag_063.htm
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This article proceeds in three parts. First, Part I demonstrates why we need
the courts by examining the failure of the immigration agency. Part II then
focuses on judicial deference in administrative law generally. Part II de-
scribes the current debates over the role of the courts in supervising or
deferring to agency action, and examines how the Court may be ratcheting up
deference to agencies. In Part III, this article then proceeds to analyze
deference jurisprudence through an immigration lens. Part III discusses how
immigration cases are increasingly being decided by administrative law
principles, even though deference jurisprudence originated with respect to
well-functioning agencies such as the EPA. Part III then argues that the
combination of the onslaught of immigration cases, the chaos at the agency,
and the emergence and application of doctrines apparently aimed at reducing
the role of the courts, shows how in the immigration realm, we may be
approaching Chevron without the courts, where the judicial role is being
weakened at the very time the immigration agency needs it most.
I. WHY WE NEED THE COURTS
If the Supreme Court were to launch a new drive to promote deference to
an administrative agency, several agencies might provide plausible vehicles.
For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) deals with
highly technical matters relying on an expert staff with training and experi-
ence far beyond that of lay judges. Alternatively, the Court might enunciate
new principles of deference in cases involving the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), which depends on a large, highly specialized staff to make
extremely nuanced medical decisions. Most simply, the Court might return to
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), whose work spawned the
original Chevron decision and which must master a wide array of highly
technical scientific disciplines. All three of these agencies—along with many
others—are generally well-regarded for their technical sophistication and
presumably bring that expertise to bear when attempting to discern what
federal statutes are most likely to mean. And on a number of occasions, the
Court has indeed used cases from these agencies as vehicles to restrict
judicial review of administrative agencies generally.46
Few, however, would have expected the deeply troubled immigration
agency, which deals with relatively non-technical issues and is too over-
whelmed to produce thoughtful deliberative decisions with any regularity, to
be the poster child for greater judicial deference to agency discretion.
(announcing reforms at the BIA); see generally Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms
to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 7309 (proposed Feb. 19, 2002).
46. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009) (weakening
“arbitrary and capricious” review of agencies’ decisions); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33
(1985) (revitalizing the doctrine of precluding review of matters “committed to agency discretion”);
see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109-10 (1998) (narrowing private
parties’ standing to seek judicial enforcement of statutes agencies have elected not to enforce).
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This Part illustrates some of the troubling consequences of heading
towards “Chevron without the courts” by looking closely at the crisis in the
immigration arena, and its implications for the agency’s interpretive role.
Ultimately, Part I argues that the current crisis in the immigration arena
demonstrates “why we need the courts”—that is, why the judicial role was,
and should remain, a critical part of Chevron’s scope.
By almost any measure, the immigration agency is the in the midst of a
crisis. A near consensus has emerged that the U.S. immigration agency is
“broken down”47 and that “much of the law governing the administration of
our immigration system exists in a state of disrepair.”48 A survey of these
problems demonstrates why a strong judicial role is both necessary for
immigration law jurisprudence and for Chevron’s future evolution.
First, under Chevron and its progeny, reflecting longstanding administra-
tive law principles, agencies are supposed to be specialists in their fields,
possessing special expertise that they can bring to bear on issues that
generalist courts may not have.49 Agencies are also supposed to be more
politically accountable than judges who may be insulated from political
concerns.50 In addition, agencies such as the immigration agency, which
operate through case-by-case adjudication, are supposed to eventually achieve
uniformity in their interpretations of statutes over time.51 For these reasons,
in cases such as Mead,52 the Court looked at the agencies’ decision-making
processes and the context in which decisions were made to determine
whether to defer to the agency.
Currently, the immigration agency cannot fulfill any of the responsibilities
that deference doctrine assumes. The immigration agency is burdened with a
nearly insurmountable backlog of cases, issuing inexplicable decisions with
concealed decision making, beset by numerous scandals including biased
judges and illegally politicized appointments,53 and is unable to meet even
47. Michael H. Posner, The Evolution of Human Rights Law, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 449,
455 (1994) (noting that proposed legislation is a reaction to the fact that the asylum system has
broken down); see also Cianciarulo, supra note 26, at 142 (“[T]his Article has examined the recently
enacted Real ID Act and has proposed interpretations of its three major asylum provisions. The
analysis reveals that the Real ID Act is a codification—albeit a vague and poorly drafted one—of
existing case law, regulations, and agency guidance. Despite the assertions of the Real ID Act’s
supporters that the legislation is designed to repair a broken asylum system, the Real ID Act makes
very few substantive changes to asylum law. Moreover, the changes that it does make will serve only
to weaken the asylum system.”); Michele R. Pistone, Asylum Filing Deadlines: Unfair and
Unnecessary, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 102 (1996) (noting that critics charge that the asylum system
is broken and needs a major overhaul).
48. See Weiss, supra note 35, at 889.
49. Kelly, supra note 16, at 164-65.
50. Id.
51. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths
Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1113 (2011).
52. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
53. Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigra-
tion Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 564 (2011) (“Immigration judge caseloads continue
to climb to record levels. In fiscal year 2009, approximately 230 immigration judges completed
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the basic requirements of legitimate decision making.54 The fundamental
problems facing the agency’s decision making include the legitimacy of “the
fairness of the proceedings, the accuracy and constituency of the outcomes,
the efficiency of the process (with respect to both fiscal resources and elapsed
time), and the acceptability of both the procedures and outcomes to parties
and to the public.”55 These problems are underscored by the additional
“problems [of] severe underfunding, reckless procedural shortcuts, the inap-
propriate politicization of the process, and a handful of adjudicators person-
ally ill-suited to the task.”56 The problems at the immigration agency read
like a laundry list of all of the reasons a court should not defer to an agency;
yet this is precisely what the Court is doing.
Indeed, the immigration agency is failing at each of the deference
rationales articulated above. Rather than bringing specialized expertise to
bear on immigration law issues, the immigration agency is notorious for its
inconsistent and sometimes inscrutable decision making and interpretations.
These “very significant differences from one decision maker to the next in the
adjudication of asylum cases should be a matter of serious concern to federal
policymakers.”57 Moreover, the agency has come under fire for repeatedly,
and inconsistently, misreading or misinterpreting its own scope of review.58
And just recently, it has been alleged that the agency made unsupported
representations about its policies to the Court on an important matter of
policy.59
These failures have not gone unnoticed by the federal judiciary who, if
current trends continue, will have to increasingly defer to the agency. “Today
a growing number of federal judges review decisions by the immigration
courts with apparent skepticism . . . . [T]he trend is significant enough to
count as an important—though often overlooked—thread of modern immi-
290,233 proceedings. Proceedings are more intensive hearings and do not include bond hearings and
other motions—thus this number does not represent total workload. Proceedings alone average over
1200 per year per judge. Despite this frenetic pace, a backlog of cases continues to build. In
September 2010, 261,083 cases were pending before the immigration courts. This backlog is forty
percent higher than the backlog two years before. The average wait time for a case before an
immigration judge is 456 days. Despite these daunting and growing caseloads, immigration judge
hiring has been slow, and immigration judges on the bench lack adequate training and other in-house
resources, like law clerks.” (footnotes omitted)). That the immigration agency is overburdened
becomes more clear when compared to other agencies. For example, the Social Security Administra-
tion employs approximately six times more judges than the immigration courts, yet immigration
judges receive more than twice as many cases as Social Security Judges do. Compare Hearing Office
Locator, http://ssa.gov/appeals/ho_locator.html and Information About Social Security’s Hearings &
Appeals Process, http://ssa.gov/appeals with Benson & White, supra note 27.
54. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 36.
55. Id. at 1639.
56. Id.
57. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 295, 303 (2007).
58. See Scott Rempell, The Board of Immigration Appeals’ Standard of Review: An Argument for
Regulatory Reform, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 283, 290 (2011) (“The Board decisions that interpret its scope
of review under the regulation are problematic for many reasons.”).
59. See supra note 32.
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gration jurisprudence.”60
Federal judges across the country have criticized the agency’s decision
making and aired their concerns over deferring to the agency. For example,
one judge stated that “[p]articularly in light of the present state of affairs at
the BIA, we should not so easily and unnecessarily relinquish our critical role
in ensuring that the agency properly exercises its awesome authority over
deportation.”61 Another stated, “[r]epeated egregious failures of the Immigra-
tion Court and Board to exercise care commensurate with the stakes in an
asylum case can be understood, but not excused, as consequences of a
crushing workload that the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government have refused to alleviate.”62 Still another wrote “[a]t the risk of
sounding like a broken record, we reiterate our oft-expressed concern with
the adjudication of asylum claims by the Immigration Court and the Board of
Immigration Appeals . . . . The performance of these federal agencies is too
often inadequate. This case presents another depressing example.”63 This
chorus has spread to every circuit and judges of all stripes.64
How did this happen? It is important to examine the failure of the
immigration agency and the potential consequences of a restricted judicial
role overseeing agency decision making, both for the potential consequences
for the agency itself and for the potential consequences for administrative
law generally.
60. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1672
(2007) (footnote omitted).
61. Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180, 199 (6th Cir. 2010).
62. Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007).
63. Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2005).
64. See, e.g., Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 943, 948 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The decision of
the Board is riddled with error” and the BIA and IJ “fail[ed] to render a reasoned decision”); Haile v.
Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Board’s conclusion . . . doesn’t follow from its
premise, and unlike a jury an administrative agency has to provide a reasoned justification for its
rulings.”); Parlak v. Holder, 578 F.3d 457, 471 (6th Cir. 2009) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“This record is
replete with error”); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are deeply disturbed by
what we perceive to be fairly obvious errors in the agency’s application of its own regulatory
framework . . . . The claims of the petitioners before us, as set forth below, did not receive the type of
careful analysis they were due.”); N’Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J.,
concurring) (noting “the significantly increasing rate at which adjudication lacking in reason, logic,
and effort” is overwhelming federal courts of appeal); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 154-55 (3d
Cir. 2005) (noting that the IJ’s “hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive” attitude toward petitioner “by
itself would require a rejection of his credibility finding”); Grupee v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that IJ’s strange holding is “hard to take seriously”); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is the IJ’s conclusion, not [the petitioner’s] testimony, that
‘strains credulity.’”); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he IJ’s
assessment of Petitioner’s credibility was skewed by prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and
conjecture . . . .”); Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The tone, the tenor, the
disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to a court television show than a
federal court proceeding.”); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The
procedure that the IJ employed in this case is an affront to [the petitioner’s] right to be heard.”); Ssali
v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) (“This very significant mistake suggests that the Board
was not aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] case . . . .”); Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d
533, 540 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The IJ erred in this case simply because he gave no cogent explanation
based on common sense, the record, or any other relevant factor for disbelieving [the petitioner].”).
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As I have detailed in previous work,65 since about 2000, there has been a
substantial and highly controversial transformation of the administrative
system of immigration review at the DOJ, the agency which oversees
immigration adjudication. In the wake of these administrative changes,
several key developments transformed the immigration agency into one that
is increasingly falling into disrepair and increasingly unable to fulfill its
Chevron-mandated interpretive role.
First, to address its surging backlog of cases, the immigration agency in
1999 and 2001 implemented a series of streamlining regulations which
allowed the appellate body at the agency, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), to issue summary affirmances of an Immigration Judge’s decision,
without having to issue an explanation of the Board’s decision or even
whether or not the Board agreed with the Immigration Judge’s decision.66
When these decisions were appealed to the federal courts, the federal courts
were left to review terse, one-line opinions with no reasoning.67
The most immediate result of these changes was that the immigration
agency’s backlog was shifted to the federal courts.68 The federal courts soon
faced a flood of immigration appeals. Beginning in 2002, for example, the
number of immigration appeals filed in the federal courts rose by about
500%; by about 2006-2007, immigration appeals made up 20% of the federal
appeals docket and about 90% of the administrative law cases in the federal
appeals courts.69
As the appeals rose, federal courts and other commentators began to
severely criticize the agency for the poor quality of its decisions, calling them
error-filled, sometimes nearly incomprehensible, arbitrary, and infused with
bias and inconsistency. In one of the most famous examples, the Seventh
Circuit’s Judge Posner declared, “adjudication of these cases at the adminis-
trative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”70 Yet,
the backlog of cases, and the terse and largely inexplicable summary
affirmances were just some of the great problems facing the agency.
In a nutshell, the following changes were occurring at the agency itself:
65. Shruti Rana, Streamlining the Rule of Law: How the Department of Justice is Undermining
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 829.
66. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) (2011); Rana, supra note 65, at 832.
67. Id. Equally troubling is the fact that many judges displayed bias or professional incompe-
tence. See Lopez-Umanzor, 405 F.3d at 1054 (noting the Immigration Judge’s assessment was
“skewed by prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture”); Marouf, supra note 36;
Richard B. Schmitt, Immigration Judges Get New Regulations, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at A15.
68. See John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration
Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for
Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 19 (2005); see also Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmances
Without Opinions, Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed.
Reg. 34654, 34655 (June 18, 2008) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
69. See COMMERCIAL & FED. LITIGATION SECTION, supra note 34, at 8; Family, supra note 53, at
583; Rana, supra note 65, at 854 n.137 (noting that cases skyrocketed from 1642 in 2001 to an
astonishing 8750 in 2004).
70. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
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straining under an increasingly severe backlog of cases, and placed under
heightened pressure to reform its handling of immigration cases in the wake
of September 11, in early 2002 the agency implemented a series of policy and
procedural changes which had sweeping effects on the federal courts.71 For
the purposes of this analysis, there are three procedural changes which are
most significant. Each of these procedural changes took place at the Board of
Immigration Appeals. The Board is an appellate body at the agency, which
hears appeals from Immigration Judges’ decisions (Immigration Judges hear
deportation orders/asylum cases). The Board issues written and precedential
decisions, which are supposed to bind the agency, and provides guidance to the
courts and public on the interpretation of immigration statutes and regulations.
The first significant change was the streamlining rules described above—
the agency implemented a procedure whereby affirmances of deportation
orders were allowed to be issued in the form of affirmances without opinion.
This meant that: (a) there were no written decisions for most affirmances of
deportation orders, and (b) the rules were written so that the affirmances
explicitly only affirmed the result, not the reasoning of the Immigration
Judge; so that when these Board affirmances went to the federal courts, no
one knew what the agency’s reasons for affirmance were. Moreover, Board
members, under tremendous resource pressures, were given time limits
which worked out to about fifteen minutes per case, a minuscule amount of
time to review extremely fact- and paper-intensive cases. The new proce-
dures rendered it far easier to “rubber-stamp” an Immigration Judge’s
deportation decision, rather than to spend the time and resources needed to
issue a reasoned decision reversing a deportation decision72—ultimately
meaning deference generally operated in one direction, that of deportation.73
Around this time, several studies began documenting extreme inconsisten-
cies in the agency’s deportation and asylum decisions and disarray in its
procedures.74 As I have argued previously, many of these changes were
wrought precisely in order to grant more discretion to the immigration
agency—discretion it was directed to use to issue as many deportation orders
as possible.75
71. See, e.g., Rana, supra note 65 (analyzing the dramatic impact of the DOJ’s streamlining
decisions on both agency decision making and on the increasingly difficult, and sometimes
inexplicable, appeals sent to the federal courts). These changes were repeatedly criticized by federal
courts struggling to deal with these appeals arriving on an almost exponential basis. See, e.g., Michele
Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 507
(2008).
72. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92
F.3d 195, 202 n.7 (3d Cir. 1996)); Walker, supra note 9, at 13.
73. See generally COMMERCIAL & FED. LITIGATION SECTION, supra note 34; Rana, supra note 65;
Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The De´ja` vu of Decisional
Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475 (2007); Walker, supra note 9.
74. See generally Taylor, supra note 74.
75. See Rana, supra note 65 (noting how the changes at the immigration agency were designed to
promote “swift and scanty” reviews of deportation decisions).
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Second, as it increasingly issued affirmances without opinion, the Board
also drastically reduced the number of precedential decisions it issued, the
decisions that were supposed to provide guiding interpretations of immigra-
tion statutes.
Third, all of this came against the backdrop of political scandal. As the
Board basically stopped issuing written opinions for many of its decisions,
the agency was also forced to launch an investigation into the actions of
allegedly biased and intemperate judges, eventually firing some of these
judges.76 Finally, an investigation into the DOJ’s hiring practices revealed
that the agency had illegally politicized hiring practices for immigration
judges,77 and, as the agency’s backlog of cases mounted, had cut the number
of Board members by firing the Board members viewed as most immigrant-
friendly.78 These two developments certainly call into question the idea that
agencies are or should be more politically accountable than the judiciary—
another reason why we need the courts in this context. Moreover, these
scandals have continued rather than abated; for example, the immigration
agency was recently forced to release an embarrassing set of documents
which revealed that the agency had deliberately misled states and localities
on their obligations to participate in certain programs.79
As noted earlier, these developments at the Board had the effect of
swamping the federal courts with immigration appeals. After 2002, the
number of immigration appeals filed in the federal courts rose by more than
600%, with the total caseload rising to record levels.80 By 2006, immigration
appeals made up nearly a fifth of the total federal appellate caseload and
approximately 90% of the administrative appeals in the federal courts,81 a
crisis that continues.82 These rising caseloads, however, were just one
indication of a larger crisis at the immigration agency.
Following the agency’s adoption of the policies of “streamlining” its
adjudication procedures and ceasing to issue written opinions for many of its
decisions,83 policies adopted due to significant resource constraints and
76. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 36, at
110-11; Schmitt, supra note 67; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9,
2006), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html.
77. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 36, at 1665-57.
78. See Rana, supra note 65.
79. See supra note 32.
80. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 27 (2006) (statement of Jonathan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice).
81. Id.
82. See Benson & Wheeler, supra note 27, at 101.
83. Id. In 2008, responding to criticism that streamlining made it difficult for the Board to publish
adequate numbers of precedential decisions, the Board proclaimed that it “published more precedents
(25) than in any other year since fiscal year 2000, and surpassed that number in fiscal year 2007,
publishing 40 decisions.” The agency further noted that the Board was doing so “[a]t a time when the
Board has been issuing approximately 44,000 decisions annually and . . . immigration judges . . .
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political pressures, studies showed that the agency’s decisions subsequently
grew more arbitrary and highly inconsistent, with the outcomes of cases
increasingly resembling “a spin of the wheel of fate.”84 As federal caseloads
rose, federal judges increasingly criticized the agency for the poor quality of
its decisions, describing them as error-filled, sometimes incomprehensible,
highly inconsistent, and infused with bias.85 Indeed, a “number of federal
appellate judges . . . suggested that the immigration courts are fundamentally
incompetent, biased, or both”86 while one federal judge famously stated that
“adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
minimum standards of legal justice.”87
These concerns have not abated over the last decade. For example, while
BIA appeals reached their high point in 2006, as of 2011 the BIA is still
struggling with massive rates of appeal. In 2011, for instance, the number of
BIA appeals was 6,311, dropping only 10% from 2006 and still nearly
quadruple the number of appeals in 2001.88 So, even if the number of appeals
may be starting to ebb, it is still vastly greater than the number of appeals in
2001, the year when appeals began their meteoric rise. In addition, cases
before Immigration Judges continue to climb,89 perhaps an indication that the
slight ebb in BIA appeals may only be a momentary respite or aberration.
Moreover, the Federal Courts of Appeal are still inundated with appeals from
the immigration agency. In 2011, for instance, immigration appeals made up
25% of the docket of the Second Circuit.90
And in terms of fulfilling its agency guidance duties, the BIA comes up
short in still another way. The BIA still decides over 90% of its appeals
through single-member affirmances, and rarely hears oral argument—
hearing only one oral argument in 2009.91
[have been] adjudicating 350,000 cases annually,” creating “an important need not only to provide
clear guidance but also to promote a degree of national uniformity and consistency in the disposition
of these cases.” 73 Fed. Reg. 34654, 34659 (June 18, 2008).
84. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 57, at 305.
85. See id. at 353; see also ABA COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION & LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION, AMERICAN JUSTICE THROUGH IMMIGRANTS’ EYES (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/americanjusticethroughimmigeyes.pdf; APPLESEED, AS-
SEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS (2009), available at
http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-Blueprint-to-
Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf; Rana, supra note 65; Immigration Courts: Still a
Troubled Institution, TRANSACTIONAL RECORD ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/210/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
86. Cox, supra note 60, at 1682.
87. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.).
88. See Benson & Wheeler, supra note 27, at 101.
89. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note
28, at Y1-Y2 (showing that a total of 297,848 immigration court cases were pending as of 9/30/2011).
This represents a rise of approximately 15,000 cases in immigration court cases pending from the
year before. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra
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Thus, in a multitude of ways, the immigration agency is currently failing to
fulfill the promise of its expanded interpretive role.92 Arguably, the problems
at the agency require greater, rather than diminished, judicial oversight over
the agency and its decision making.93
In short, with a series of largely unreadable decisions, concealed reason-
ing, a large backlog of cases,94 biased judges,95 illegal hiring practices,96 a
lack of transparency at many levels,97 a chorus of federal judges criticizing
the agency for its unreasoned, error-filled, or just inexplicable decisions,98
and unsupported representations by the agency,99 there are a number of
arguments to be made that the immigration agency either is incapable of, or
currently unable to, bring greater expertise to statutory interpretation issues
than the federal courts, sufficient to justify the courts deferring to the
agency.100 The Chevron and administrative law rationales for deference to an
agency are largely missing, if not entirely absent. Under almost any measure,
indicators of quality decision making are lacking at the immigration agency,
and the agency appears unable to meet the minimum threshold requirements
for deference.
Furthermore, the increased deference shown to the agency does not appear
to be spurring the additional exercise of agency expertise that the Court may
have been hoping for, but rather precisely the opposite, as the immigration
92. Significantly, these developments circumscribing judicial review have occurred just as the
Board’s role and review have become more critical. See John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference
to Agency Decisions in Removal Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605,
607 (2005) (“Given the diminished circuit court jurisdiction and the narrow scope of judicial review,
the Board has become the final arbiter on direct appeal for most issues involving the exercise of
discretion and, in cases involving aliens with serious criminal offenses, for all issues related to relief
from removal.”).
93. See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 34654, 34659 (June 18, 2008) (“The number of Board decisions
published as precedent also has important implications for judicial review. The courts of appeals have
been issuing hundreds of precedent decisions each year in reviewing cases decided by the Board, and
a substantial number of the court decisions are interpreting the immigration laws and regulations. As
a result, the courts of appeals, in many cases, have found themselves faced with the need to resolve
key interpretive or procedural issues without the benefit of any precedential guidance from the Board
on those issues”).
94. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 36, at 1651-52.
95. See generally Marouf, supra note 36.
96. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 36, at 1665-57.
97. Benson, supra note 38, at 13 (noting that greater transparency was needed during the period
in question).
98. See, e.g., Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 943, 951 (11th Cir. 2010) (remanding to the
BIA because the decision of the Board was “riddled with error” and the BIA and IJ “fail[ed] to render
a reasoned decision”); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are deeply disturbed
by what we perceive to be fairly obvious errors in the agency’s application of its own regulatory
framework . . . The claims of the petitioners before us, as set forth below, did not receive the type of
careful analysis they were due.”); Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2005) (“At the risk
of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate our oft-expressed concern with the adjudication of
asylum claims by the Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . The perfor-
mance of these federal agencies is too often inadequate. This case presents another depressing
example.”); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) (“This very significant mistake
suggests that the Board was not aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] case . . .”).
99. See supra note 32.
100. See Farbenblum, supra note 51, at 1059.
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agency acts in increasingly erratic ways. As just one illustration, the immigra-
tion authorities recently had to release a set of embarrassing documents
revealing the agency’s obfuscation on its new Secure Communities program,
further revealing the chaos and ad hoc nature of decision making in the
immigration realm.101 In another example of the agency’s failure to act
promptly, important cases that have been remanded by the Supreme Court to
the agency have languished at the agency level with no action. For example,
though the Supreme Court remanded the case of Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S.
511 (2009), back to the agency in 2009, as of this writing the agency has yet
to act upon this case. Such delays further frustrate the purpose of the right to
judicial review.102 The recent Judulang v. Holder case provides another
interesting example. There, the Court described the mixed messages the
agency was sending and found the agency’s reasoning indefensible and
“unmoored from the purposes and concern of the immigration laws.”103
In this light, it seems fair to say that the recent limitations on the judicial
role over immigration decisions have come at precisely the time when the
judicial role has become more important, and the agency has increasingly
been failing to fulfill its expanded interpretive role. In other words, we now
have a crisis where the courts are being required to step in, but where the
courts have less and less power to do so in a meaningful way as the judicial
role mandated by Chevron is being increasingly weakened. In this sense, we
may be ultimately heading towards “Chevron without the courts” at least in
the immigration arena, and with the potential to spread into other areas of
administrative law.
The crisis at the immigration agency shows why we need the courts—the
judicial role is not only an important one, but becomes highly significant in
light of agency degeneration. With respect to the immigration agency,
mistakes or inconsistencies at the agency can have severe consequences—
sending people to persecution or even death in other countries.104 A strong
judicial role is needed to help address or mitigate the problems at agencies in
chaos such as the immigration agency, to increase consistency in decision
making, and to generally promote the rule of law.
We need the judicial role in the statutory interpretation/Chevron realm for
other highly significant reasons as well. Undermining Chevron’s two steps by
essentially abdicating the judicial role “invites the courts to elide the
constraints Chevron rightly imposes on the scope of independent judicial construc-
tion of regulatory statutes, and undermines the utility of judicial decisions
101. Esquivel, supra note 79.
102. See also Kevin R. Johnson and Serena Faye Salinas, Remand Symposium: Judicial Remands
of Immigration Cases: Lessons in Administrative Discretion from INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 44 Ariz.
St. L. J. 1041, 1059 (2012) (discussing immigration cases that have been left to languish at the agency
despite a court’s instructions for further proceedings on remand).
103. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 490 (2011).
104. See Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing the drastic remedy
of deportation and the harsh consequences of deportation).
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reviewing agency action as guides for further administrative choices.”105
This is a very real concern in an agency run amok as the immigration
agency has become. When agencies “come to expect less scrutiny” from the
courts, quality often suffers. That is, “[t]here is reason to believe that
Chevron’s methodology has actually lowered the quality of administrative
decision-making on technical and expert matters, since agencies have come
to expect less scrutiny on those dimensions in the Chevron era. The doctrine
relieves the pressure on agencies to develop a full, expert record, and to
engage in a full-bodied review of technical or expert considerations, as those
administrative tasks are no longer of central concern to the courts.”106
Furthermore, eroding the boundaries between the institutional roles of the
courts and agencies undermines the comparative institutional advantage each
can bring to bear on important issues, and also “blunts Chevron’s utility as a
framework for circumscribing the appropriate scope of independent judicial
decision making more generally, including in those cases in which a court
must resolve a statute’s meaning before an agency has exercises its interpre-
tive authority in a format entitled to Chevron deference.”107
The disarray at the immigration agency—perhaps the disaster agency of
our time—shows how critical the judicial role in statutory interpretation can
be. Furthermore, analysis of the court’s recent immigration jurisprudence
reveals that for whatever reasons—political, historical, or something else108—
the Supreme Court has chosen to ignore this disarray and is granting the
immigration agency increasing, rather than decreasing, deference.
These developments raise the following questions for future analysis: Is
this what Chevron really intended? Is Chevron legitimately being redrawn in
the immigration realm despite the push for quality in Mead and other cases?
Is the Court’s current interpretation of Chevron a plausible interpretation of
Congressional intent? Finally, does the immigration crisis show that Chevron
should have no place in the immigration context—that no deference should
be given to an agency in collapse?
II. DO WE HAVE THE COURTS? THE CONTRACTION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
At least in the immigration context, the Court is currently moving Chevron
in directions that are little understood.109 This Part traces the background of
administrative law deference jurisprudence, focusing on developments re-
lated to Chevron and on the debates surrounding Chevron. Section A
105. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 1, at 612.
106. Foote, supra note 6, at 709.
107. Id.
108. See Rana, supra note 65 (charging that immigration law after September 11, 2001 had
become increasingly politicized, with the emphasis shifting towards summary and wholesale
deportations).
109. See Kelly, supra note 16, at 158 (stating that “Chevron started as a schizophrenic doctrine”
and fostered multiple approaches to deference).
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discusses the evolution of the roles of the judiciary and agencies as the
modern administrative state emerged, and sets the stage for the current
debates over the boundaries of these roles. Section B then lays out the
debates surrounding Chevron, Mead, and Brand X, highlighting the uncertain
state of current deference doctrine.
A. The Evolution of the Judicial Interpretive Role: The Courts’Authority
to Say What the “Law” Is
The judicial and executive branches have long been locked in a complex
struggle over the scope and meaning of their respective power. This section
discusses the evolution of the judicial interpretive role from its constitutional
foundations to the rise of the modern administrative state, focusing on the
conceptual underpinnings of the current Chevron controversies.
The constitutional origins of the judicial interpretive role lie in Article III,
vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court.110 This provision is tradition-
ally understood, in Marbury’s words, to confer on the courts the authority “to
say what the law is,”111 including the ability to override the executive and
construe statutes. Under this framework, the judicial interpretive role was a
strong one; arguably, “[w]ithin the original understanding, the ‘judicial
power’ was to announce what a statute means, not to acquiesce in an agency’s
interpretation of the law unless it is foreclosed by the statute.”112 In other
words, it was not the agency’s role “to say what the law is.”113
Throughout the nineteenth century, as government administration re-
mained relatively simple, the Court appears to have largely followed this
Marbury model of separation of powers.114 Courts generally refrained from
interfering with the administrative tasks of the Executive Branch, but
asserted the power to construe and interpret statutes when the need arose in
cases before them.115
Courts increasingly confronted such questions as administration become
more complex, particularly after the turn of the twentieth century as Con-
gress created new regulatory agencies in a growing number of fields such as
communications and a range of commercial activities.116 However, the most
significant challenge to this traditional framework arose with the New Deal
110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
112. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1159-60.
113. See supra notes 15, 51.
114. See Gifford, supra note 8, at 786-89 (2007) (discussing the “Nineteenth Century Model” of
judicial review and its historical and legal underpinnings).
115. Gifford, supra note 8, at 788; see also Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administra-
tive Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 206-09 (1991) (offering examples of
judicial administration in the early Republic).
116. Gifford, supra note 8, at 789-90 (discussing the creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which oversaw the regulation of railroad rates in 1887, the creation of the Federal Trade
Commission in 1914, and Federal Radio Commission in 1927).
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and the rise of the modern administrative state.
In the 1930s, Congress created a number of independent agencies as
“regulation proliferated.”117 During this period, agencies were generally
subject to judicial review, and the judicial interpretive role remained strong;
indeed, “[t]he New Deal Congress rejected extreme proposals that would
have marginalized judges and denied them their Marbury role of independent
judgment in statutory interpretation.”118 However, the increasing regulatory
complexity demanded greater clarity over the judicial and agency roles.119
To address this need, in 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).120 The APA set forth the basic framework delineating
the power between courts and agencies in the modern administrative state,
reserving for the courts the powers “to decide all relevant questions of law”
and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions” in Section 706.121 The
APA further directed courts to invalidate agency actions that are “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law.”122
The precise contours of these provisions have been the subject of much
debate, though it has been argued that the APA did not significantly change
the judicial role.123 Following the enactment of the APA, courts exercised
their power to interpret statutes and to mark the boundaries of agency
authority, while at the same time allowing space for agencies to exercise their
expertise and to design policies.124 In essence, “[w]hile maintaining primary
and ultimate authority on questions of law, courts pre-Chevron recognized
that agencies constituted a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may resort for guidance.”125
Two key analytical features of the court/agency divide emerged and were
117. Gifford, supra note 8, at 790-91.
118. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1160; see also Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in
Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 575-76 (1992) (acknowledging the quick promulgation
of judicial deference for the sake of combating the Great Depression, but noting the widespread
concerns regarding insufficient control of administrative action). Congress’s concerns regarding the
protection of judicial deference were also reflected in the 1939 Walter-Logan Bill, which would have
introduced stronger provisions for judicial review if President Roosevelt had not vetoed the bill.
Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 98 (1996).
119. Gifford, supra note 8 at 792; Werhan, supra note 117, at 575 (arguing that “the New Deal did
not produce a coherent approach to administrative law”).
120. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006)).
121. Id.; see also A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 54-55
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) [hereinafter DUFFY & HERZ].
122. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
123. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 75 (1977) (address-
ing the APA scope of review provisions as “a good summary of the law of judicial review”); KENNETH
WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 430 (Westview Press 2004) (1982)
(characterizing APA § 706, the “Scope of Review” section, as “largely a codification of court opinions
on scope of review”); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1120-62 (arguing that the operative
provisions of the APA regarding the judicial role “follow the traditional Marbury model”).
124. Gifford, supra note 8, at 793-94.
125. See Kelly, supra note 16, at 153 n.5.
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strengthened over the next three decades.126 First, the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized agencies’ authority to resolve ambiguities in statutory
terms.127 Second, the Court also solidified the division of authority between
courts and agencies “through the language of ‘law’ and ‘fact,’” as “[c]ourts
decided questions of law while agencies decided questions of fact.”128 As
synthesized, this meant that courts were to defer to agency determinations of
ultimate fact, and to agencies’ determinations regarding how to apply
statutory terms where there was sufficient support in the record and law for
the agency’s position, while also exercising judicial authority to determine
the scope of ambiguity in statutory terms.129
Still, analytical tensions remained. Courts were essentially told to defer to
agencies’ regulatory decision making, while also operating as a check on
such authority.130 Key questions facing the courts regarding the relationship
between the judicial and agency interpretive roles included the extent to
which a court should “make up its own mind, independently, about the
meaning of the words of the statute” and the court’s attitude towards agency
action, or “its readiness to set aside [an agency’s regulatory policy] as
unreasonable, arbitrary or inadequately considered.”131
In the decades following the passage of the APA, and as regulation
continued to grow in complexity, the Supreme Court appeared to equivocate
on the scope of judicial interpretive authority, sometimes emphasizing
judicial authority to interpret statutes and other times emphasizing deference
to agency determinations.132 The Court declared both that if an agency’s
“construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected
merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute” and at
other times explicitly stated that “the judiciary is responsible for the final
determination of the meaning of statutes.”133 As the Court teetered in both
directions in the face of these competing concerns, “[a]n enormous body of
case law and scholarly writing” arose attempting “to reconcile these arguably
126. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 365-67 (1986) (discussing significant post-APA Supreme Court cases discussing the judicial and
agency authority); Gifford, supra note 8, at 793-94.
127. Gifford, supra note 8, at 793-94.
128. Id. at 794.
129. Id. at 794.
130. See Breyer, supra note 126, at 364-65 (discussing the “two basically conflicting pressures”
facing courts, “the need for regulation and for checks on regulators” as courts are urged to both “defer
to administrative interpretations of regulatory statutes” and “review agency decisions of regulatory
policy strictly.”).
131. Id. at 364.
132. See id. at 365-67 (discussing the “two opposite judicial attitudes” during this time period
reflected in cases deferring to agencies as well as cases where the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
“the judiciary is responsible for the final determination of the meaning of statutes”).
133. See id. at 367 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) and FTC v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) as examples of the conflicting pronouncements on
scope of the courts’ and agencies’ roles).
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conflicting obligations.”134
With its 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council (“Chevron”),135 the Court attempted to clarify the appropri-
ate framework for courts’ and agencies’ interpretive roles. The Chevron
framework and its implications rapidly became the focus of the interpretive
debate.136
B. Chevron and its Impact on the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation
Chevron marked a critical milestone in the debates over the nature of the
judicial interpretive role. In Chevron, the Court attempted to set forth a
framework reconciling the requirements of Article III and Marbury’s edict
that the courts must “say what the law is” with the necessities of the modern
administrative state. The Chevron case dealt directly with the primary issue
“that courts [found] most perplexing” in the allocation of authority between
courts and agencies: “[t]he extent to which courts should defer to agency
interpretations of statutory terms and the extent to which courts should
construe these terms independently.”137
Chevron involved an agency interpretation by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”), which had issued a regulation defining a term,
“stationary source,” appearing in its governing statute.138 In reviewing the
agency’s interpretation, the Court of Appeals found that the Clean Air Act
had not explicitly defined the term “stationary source,” but set aside the
EPA’s definition of the term as “inappropriate.”139 The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the Court of Appeals had erred in construing the term
“stationary source” after determining that Congress had failed to define this
term. The Supreme Court then set forth its vision of courts’ proper role in an
oft-quoted passage:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
134. See DUFFY & HERZ, supra note 121, at 55; see also Breyer, supra note 125, at 365.
135. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
136. See DUFFY & HERZ, supra note121, at 54 (noting that since the mid-1980s, the effort to
reconcile the competing obligations of judicial interpretation and deference have “centered on the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in [Chevron], which has become the most-cited and most-
discussed decision in administrative law” (citation omitted)).
137. See Gifford, supra note 8, at 784.
138. See 467 U.S. at 839-41.
139. Id. at 841 (quoting the lower court’s opinion in Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch,
685 F.2d 718, 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
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court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.140
Chevron thus critically reshaped, and restricted, the judicial role in
interpreting regulatory statutes. Though Chevron stated that “the judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional in-
tent,”141 the framework the case established “served as a kind of ‘counter-
Marbury’ for the regulatory state,” mandating deference to reasonable
agency interpretations where there was statutory silence or ambiguity.142
Chevron thus carried significant institutional implications and rapidly
became “the most-cited and most-discussed decision in administrative law.”143
Moreover, though superficially simple, the Chevron framework spawned
significant confusion and criticism,144 proved to be “complicated as a matter
of theory and chaotic as a matter of practice”145 and, it soon became clear,
left many questions unanswered.146
One of the most critical questions Chevron left unanswered is the precise
contours of its Step One. Stated another way, what are the scope and limits of
the courts’ interpretive role? How “independently” can a court construe the
meaning of statutory terms?147 This question drives to the heart of the
confusion and doctrinal instability in the Chevron framework.148 Chevron
140. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
141. Id. at 843 n.9.
142. DUFFY & HERZ, supra note 121, at 56.
143. Id. at 54.
144. See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 532 (2003) (“[D]espite the almost two decade existence of the Chevron decision,
there continues to be confusion about the scope of judicial deference to agency decisions. Circuit
splits have arisen over the applicability of Chevron deference and there has been inconsistency even
within circuits over its proper scope.”); see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1156-57 (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s deference doctrine is complicated as a matter of theory and chaotic as a matter of
practice . . . . In short, the Supreme Court’s deference jurisprudence is a mess.”).
145. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1156-57.
146. See id. at 1097 (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions which “suggest that there are
many issues Chevron left unresolved,” including a number of doctrinal questions such as whether
there is some kind of super-deference involved when agencies are interpreting their own prior
regulations or acting on foreign affairs or national security matters).
147. See Breyer, supra note 125, at 364.
148. See Gifford, supra note 8, at 798-99 (arguing that “while the Chevron formula is easily
stated, it was inherently unstable in its original form because it did not address many critical issues,”
including that ambiguity is a matter of degree and tends to vary with the interpretive approach
applied, thus leading to inconsistencies; that Chevron provides an unsatisfactory rationale for
deference, the difficulty of distinguishing when deference is required or not, and how the deference
mandated by Chevron would play out against the rule of stare decisis and judicial interpretation);
Slocum, supra note 143, at 532 (“One major area of confusion is whether Chevron applies to agency
interpretations of purely legal questions, especially ones that do not implicate agency expertise.”);
see also Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 597 n.3 (pointing out that a number of scholars
have recognized the doctrinal instabilities in Chevron regarding the difficulty of distinguishing
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seems to envision a strong role for the courts at Step One, declaring that
“[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congres-
sional intent.”149 Chevron gives courts significant authority by empowering
them to rely on any “traditional tools of statutory construction,” rather than
just the law’s language to find an authoritative meaning.150 The nature of the
judicial interpretive role has also given rise to a “doctrinal tug-of-war”
between the justices, in particular between Chevron’s author, Justice Stevens,
and Justice Scalia.151
In the decades after Chevron, this “doctrinal tug of war”152 continued to
escalate. Each time the Court addresses the judicial interpretive role under
Chevron, scholars, courts and commentators debate over the scope and
implications of these decisions.153
However, the focus of these debates has recently been sharpening; as one
commentator put it, “[m]ore than at any time in recent years, a threshold
between Chevron’s two steps as well as between Chevron and other strands of judicial review
doctrine).
149. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
150. DUFFY & HERZ, supra note 121, at 57.
151. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1088-89 (“Since Cardoza-Fonseca, there has
been a doctrinal tug of war within the Supreme Court between Justice Stevens (Chevron’s author) and
Scalia (the cheerleader for a broad reading).”); see also Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 1, at 619-21
(discussing the Justices’ divergent views on Chevron). See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92
VA. L. REV. 187, 192-93 (2006), for a very good description of each justice’s views and their internal
debates regarding Chevron’s reach. See also id. at 193 n.28 (discussing the debates reflected in the
Justices’ statements in Cardoza-Fonseca and Brand X).
152. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1088-89.
153. See, e.g., Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More unto the Breach: Reconciling
Chevron Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review After United States v. Haggar Apparel Company, 49
AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1230 (2000) (“With the narrow holding of Haggar limited to legislative
regulations and its implications unclear, it is not surprising that the task of reconciling Chevron
analysis and de novo judicial review in the [United States Court of International Trade] required the
Supreme Court to agree to examine the subject again in Mead. Customs litigants are being
commanded, as were King Henry’s troops, to charge “once more unto [the] breach” before the
applicability of Chevron analysis in customs litigation is determined.”); Russell L. Weaver, The
Emperor Has No Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173,
201 (2002) (“In recent years, the Chevron doctrine has been derailed, especially by the Court’s recent
decisions in Mead and Christensen. Those decisions establish dual deference standards, and indicate
the focus of Chevron deference is whether Congress intended to allow the agency to interpret with the
‘force of law’ in the format that was used. These glosses are a most unwelcome and undesirable
addition to the law. They ask courts to search for congressional intent in situations where such intent
is non-existent or not ascertainable.”); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead has Muddled
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2005) (commenting on Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), that “[t]he Supreme Court has not clarified the relationship between
Mead and Barnhart, which were decided only one Term apart. As a result, it has left lower courts
simply to choose between them. But rather than a split in the circuits between those consistently
applying Mead and those consistently applying Barnhart, we see individual panels favoring one or
another and panels in later cases involving the same interpretive procedure—in whatever circuit—
following the previous panel’s decision. Thus, Chevron deference appears to depend more than
anything else on whether the first panel to evaluate a particular interpretive procedure favors
Mead-style factors or Barnhart-style factors.”); William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal
Statutory Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 719, 732 (2002) (arguing that “Mead’s vague test is an invitation to extensive litigation and
inconclusive results on a threshold issue that may have little effect on the ultimate outcome”).
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question—the scope of judicial review—has become one of the most vexing
in regulatory cases.”154
As noted above, in one strand of recent Chevron jurisprudence, the Court
has generally refused to defer to agency interpretations deemed to have not
been produced though processes showing sufficient quality in the agency’s
decision making.155 These cases indicate that the Court is seeking quality
from the agencies, and in doing so is shifting interpretive power away from
the agencies and towards the courts, seeking to strengthen the independent
interpretive judgment courts should exercise.
Another line of cases suggests that the Court has continued its “tilt toward
deference.”156 The Court has appeared in this line of cases to be generally
providing agencies more leeway in their decision making, “extend[ing] the
agency flexibility over policy that had been a hallmark of the Chevron
doctrine” and allowing agencies “greater freedom to agencies to formulate
their own statutory interpretations and to revise them than did the earlier
law.”157
In Brand X, the Court took up the question of the scope of stare decisis
over agency decision making. The Brand X case involved a construction of a
statutory term by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which
was challenged in the Ninth Circuit.158 The appellate court rejected the
FCC’s interpretation of the term, “telecommunications” service, because it
conflicted with prior Ninth Circuit precedent construing the same term.159
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that judicial statutory interpretations
would bind an agency only where the court determined that the statute was
154. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 190; see also Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 1, at 619-21
(discussing the Justices’ divergent views on Chevron); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1088-89
(“Since Cardoza-Fonseca, there has been a doctrinal tug of war within the Supreme Court between
Justice Stevens (Chevron’s author) and Scalia (the cheerleader for a broad reading).”).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that Chevron
deference applies only when it is clear that Congress delegated authority to an agency for it “to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promul-
gated in the exercise of that authority”); see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (ruling
that Chevron deference depends on “the interpretive method used and the nature of the question at
issue”); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (ruling that interpretations of agency
opinion letters, “like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforce-
ment guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference”); see,
e.g., Bressman, supra note 153, at 1475 (“Mead has muddled judicial review of agency action”);
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 840-48 (2001).
156. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1087 (discussing the “Chevron revolution” and the
Court’s ongoing tilt towards deference to agency decisionmaking).
157. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 155, at 833; Elliott, supra note 4, at 5 (“Chevron marked
a significant way-station in the evolution of the so-called ‘Administrative State.’ Chevron remains a
significant milestone in our evolving constitutional structure because it has given more policy
discretion and law-making authority to administrative agencies, most of which are a part of the
Executive Branch. This trend is a gradual, but fundamental, change in the nature of American
government without the benefit of a constitutional amendment.”).
158. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), rev’g
Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
159. Id.
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unambiguous or Chevron was inapplicable.160 The Court reasoned that, just
as a federal court’s interpretation of a state’s law does not foreclose a state
court from adopting a contrary interpretation of state law, a judicial interpre-
tation of an ambiguous statute an agency is charged with administering does
not foreclose the agency from adopting a conflicting (yet reasoned) interpre-
tation. Moreover, even agency interpretations inconsistent with prior agency
precedent would be owed deference so long as the agency’s change in
position was sufficiently justified. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Brand X warned
that Brand X would render “judicial decisions subject to reversal by execu-
tive officers,” that it was probably unconstitutional because it would allow
agencies to adopt positions which Article III courts had already deemed
unlawful, and that Brand X would merely add to the confusion spawned by
Mead.161
Brand X can thus be viewed as emphasizing the Chevron trend towards
“freeing agencies from stare decisis”—so long as an ambiguity exists in its
statute, an agency need not follow the court’s construction.162 Brand X thus
clarified that once a court finds an ambiguity in the statute, and consequently
a gap for the agency to fill, the court’s role is limited to assessing the
reasonableness of the agency’s decision in filling that gap. The Court claimed
that Brand X was simply reiterating or following Chevron, and thus did not
really break new ground.163 However, some commentators argued that
Brand X had measurably tilted deference further towards agencies. As they
put it, “Brand X added another point of dispute to an already convoluted
doctrine, and significantly expanded the number of cases in which the
doctrine would come into play,” and this “somewhat troubling decision held
out to agencies the rejuvenating promise that administrative deference would
be a renewable resource.” Under Brand X, some argued that “there would be
no precedential sclerosis in the administrative state.”164
Brand X165 has been described as “the capstone of a series of decisions in
160. See id. at 983.
161. Id. at 1015-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Recent Case, Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974
(2009) (“After Brand X, all courts owe deference to the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of statutory
ambiguities no matter when those interpretations are issued.”).
163. See Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558, 1573 (2011) (“The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Brand X
significantly “amplified” Chevron’s already-powerful standard of judicial deference.”).
164. See Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1974.
165. 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (discussing the impact of Brand X on the issue of Chevron’s scope).
Brand X arose in the context of an administrative law landscape already marked by confusion and
controversy over the scope of deference due to agency action following the Supreme Court’s decision
in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (modifying the categories of agency action due
deference under Chevron). See Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347,
361 (2003) (concluding that “the Court has inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a
no-man’s land”).
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which the Supreme Court revisited its doctrine of judicial deference to
agency interpretations of law.”166 Brand X has spawned a great deal of
controversy over where the courts’ role as “decider” should now begin and
end,167 and on the nature of Brand X’s impact on Chevron doctrine.168 That
is, “Brand X offered agencies another tool with which to claim deference
from courts.”169
These arguably competing themes in the Court’s recent Chevron jurispru-
dence have generated much scholarly controversy. On one hand, some argue
that doctrinally, Chevron’s analytical inquiry should be collapsed into a
single judicial task—that of assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s
statutory interpretation.170 Others argue that there is still a critical, and
analytically distinct, judicial interpretive role focusing on “judicial ascertain-
ment of the range of meaning available to the agency” under the statute at
issue,171 and that collapsing this inquiry “muddies Chevron’s task-allocation
function, thus distracting courts from an essential judicial function: that of
bounding agency authority.”172 Furthermore, collapsing such a task “invites
courts to elide the constraints Chevron rightly imposes on the scope of
independent judicial construction of regulatory statutes, and undermines the
utility of judicial decisions reviewing agency action as guides for future
administrative choices.”173
The next Part analyzes how deference jurisprudence has played out in
recent immigration cases. In the immigration context at least, this Part argues
that there can be little doubt that the Supreme Court has significantly tilted
toward restricting the interpretative authority of the courts and requiring that
the courts show greater deference to the immigration agency.
166. See Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1971; see also Gifford, supra note 8, at 830 (discussing
the agency role under Brand X and stating that the “agency’s role as authoritative interpreter—both
before and after interpretive issues come before a court—thus brings the current paradigm of
agency/court interaction closer to completion.”).
167. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 1, at 617.
168. Id. at 614 (noting that the authors are among the group of courts and commentators who
interpret Chevron as having two distinct steps, “i.e., Step One as judicial ascertainment of the range
of meaning available to the agency; Step Two as review of any agency determination falling within
that range.”). See also id. (noting some felt that Brand X did nothing to clarify the preexisting
doctrinal confusion about when such deference would be granted”).
169. See Recent Case, supra note 162, at 1969.
170. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 597-98; see generally Bamberger & Strauss,
supra note 1 (discussing Stephenson and Vermeule’s proposal for a unitary doctrinal inquiry under
Chevron).
171. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 1, at 614 (noting that the authors are among the group
of courts and commentators who interpret Chevron as having two distinct steps, “i.e., Step One as
judicial ascertainment of the range of meaning available to the agency; Step Two as review of any
agency determination falling within that range.”).
172. Id. at 612.
173. Id.
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III. LOOKING THROUGH AN IMMIGRATION LENS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
RECENT CHEVRON JURISPRUDENCE
The immigration arena is in many ways an ideal case study for assessing
the implications of how deference doctrines are being reshaped. In many
ways, the “history of immigration jurisprudence is a history of obsession
with judicial deference”174—one that continues, and appears to be deepen-
ing, today. This Part constructs an immigration lens to evaluate the ways in
which the judicial role is being refashioned through recent Chevron jurispru-
dence. To this end, this Part assesses the implications of little-analyzed recent
Supreme Court immigration decisions wherein the Court directly tackles
questions over the nature of the judicial role. This Part argues that these
decisions reveal that—at least in the immigration context—the judicial
interpretive role has been further restricted than it appears from the non-
immigration administrative law decisions on which most scholarly attention
has focused to date.
A. What Can an Immigration Lens Contribute?
Much of the debate over whether there has been (or should be) a shift in the
judicial interpretive role under Chevron since approximately 2000 has
focused on a few high-profile Supreme Court decisions such as Christensen
v. Harris County,175 United States v. Mead Corp.,176 and National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, (“Brand X”).177 Of
the vast amount of scholarship in this area addressing these recent develop-
ments,178 very little focuses primarily on immigration cases, or discusses
174. Cox, supra note 60, at 1671.
175. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
176. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
177. 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (discussing the impact of Brand X on the issue of Chevron’s scope).
Brand X arose in the context of an administrative law landscape already marked by confusion and
controversy over the scope of deference due to agency action following the Supreme Court’s decision
in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (which modified the categories of agency action
due deference under Chevron). See Vermeule, supra note165, at 361 (concluding that “the Court has
inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a no-man’s land”); Recent Case, supra note 162,
at 1969 (“Over the last decade, cases such as United States v. Mead Corp. and Barnhart v. Walton
have transformed the Court’s doctrine around deference to agencies from a two-part test to a
convoluted multi-factor analysis”).
178. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 155, at 840-48; Merrill, supra note 6, at 807 (arguing
that “United States v. Mead Corp. is the U.S. Supreme Court’s most important pronouncement to date
about the scope of the Chevron doctrine”); see, e.g., Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down:
Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 431 (2006) (claiming that
Brand X is a significant decision in administrative law because it clarifies that the Chevron doctrine
trumps stare decisis); Sunstein, supra note 151, at 211-19 (citing Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart v.
Walton as a “trilogy” of cases “attempt[ing] to sort out the applicability of the Chevron framework”);
Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L.
REV. 725, 762-71 (2007) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644
(2007); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007); Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S.
20 (2003); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36 (2002); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.
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how examining recent immigration jurisprudence can offer broader insights
into the ways in which the Court may be revising Chevron.
This scholarly omission is particularly noteworthy given the significance
of immigration cases to the Court’s Chevron jurisprudence in previous
decades.179 For example, one of the key post-Chevron cases illustrating the
Court’s struggle over the boundaries of the judicial interpretive role under
Chevron is INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,180 a 1987 immigration case wherein the
Court dealt directly with judicial and agency interpretations of the term
“well-founded fear” in the governing immigration statute, and declined to
defer to the agency construction as “contrary to clear Congressional in-
tent.”181 Cardoza-Fonseca has remained one of the most influential cases
applying the Chevron doctrine.182
Nonetheless, most commentators have focused on a series of non-
immigration administrative law cases in their attempts to understand how the
judicial role under Chevron has changed over time.183 Indeed, many view
Brand X as the culmination of the Court’s most recent attempts to revise
judicial and agency roles under Chevron.184 This stems from the fact that
most scholars analyzing how the judicial role under Chevron has changed
415 (1999) as significant recent case law interpreting the Chevron doctrine); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549 (2009) (using Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department
of Education and Gonzales v. Oregon to illustrate the effectiveness of a delegation-respecting
approach to the Chevron doctrine).
179. The Court held that the Chevron deference framework applies to the immigration agency’s
interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425
(1999).
180. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
181. Id. at 447 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
182. See, e.g., DUFFY & HERZ, supra note 121, at 56; Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1087
(discussing some of the implications of Cardoza-Fonseca for the “Chevron revolution”).
183. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000)
(applying the Chevron doctrine to foreign affairs deference); see also Elliott, supra note 4 (applying
the Chevron doctrine to environmental law); Evan Criddle, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpreta-
tion, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1928 (2003) (treating Chevron as an inferior “paradigm for conceptualizing
judicial deference to executive treaty interpretation” found in administrative treaty case law); Jacob
E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007) (advocating
institutionalizing judicial deference to administrative agencies); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron,
and the Spending Powers, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1191 (2001) (using Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman to argue that “Chevron deference should not apply to agency interpretations issued after
the state accepts [federal] funds”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006) (evaluating
post-Chevron Supreme Court and circuit court decisions and their relationship to judges’ political
ideology); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441,
1460-86 (2008) (arguing that Chevron should be applied conservatively to preemption cases).
184. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 8, at 830 (discussing the agency role under Brand X and stating
that the “agency’s role as authoritative interpreter—both before and after interpretive issues come
before a court—thus brings the current paradigm of agency/court interaction closer to completion.”);
see also Foote, supra note 6, at 690-91 (identifying Brand X as a case that “illustrates the remarkable
transformation of the paradigm of agency work from the pre-Chevron years—when the Court would
have treated analogous acts of public administration as informal administrative policy implementa-
tion subject to review under the APA’s standard of arbitrariness—to the distorted reality of Chevron
where the Court deems interstitial administrative applications to be questions of law subject to the
Court’s own norms of judicial review”); see also May, supra note 178, at 431.
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have approached this issue from an administrative law perspective, not an
immigration one.185
Yet, the Court’s shift towards agency deference is perhaps most clearly
made manifest in its immigration jurisprudence. This jurisprudence stands
out for another reason as well: the high stakes involved in immigration
cases—often life or death—present a harsh backdrop to scholarly and
judicial debates over deference. Thus, perhaps more than in other areas of
administrative law, the political, human rights, and national security issues at
stake in immigration cases often underscore the potentially high stakes
involved in the debates over the nature of the judicial role.186 It is not
surprising, then, that deference issues have long been of heightened signifi-
cance in the immigration context.187
Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater depth in Sections B and C
below, recent developments in the immigration arena have brought immigra-
tion issues to the forefront of federal court jurisprudence generally. Follow-
ing September 11, 2001, when the federal courts faced an unprecedented
flood of immigration cases, political pressure for deportations began to
rise.188 In the Second Circuit, for example, the number of immigration
appeals filed rose fourteen-fold between 2002 and 2006, while the Ninth
Circuit saw a nearly six-fold increase in immigration appeals.189 By 2006,
immigration appeals made up nearly a fifth of the federal appellate caseload
and approximately 90% of the administrative appeals in the federal courts.190
This caseload expansion appears to have percolated up to the Supreme Court
as well; in recent years the Supreme Court has been taking up an increasing
number of immigration cases.191 Moreover, as Sections B and C argue in
185. See generally notes 16-20, supra.
186. See Slocum, supra note144, at 518 (“[I]mmigration law, in a variety of ways, is more
important than ever before. The current level of immigration to the United States is as high as or
higher than at any time in American history. In addition, concerns about terrorism have spurred an
increased interest in immigration policy and legislation, with the government using immigration
provisions to help fight terrorism and some arguing for a reexamination of our open immigration
policies.”); see also Guendelsberger, supra note 92, at 624-26 (discussing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,
526 U.S. 415 (1999) as an example of an immigration case which highlights the interplay between
politics, foreign relations and administrative law).
187. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110
(1988); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 524 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating
Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 23 (2002) (“the
modern Court has frequently stated that ‘[o]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”); Cox, supra note 60, at 1671 (“The
history of immigration jurisprudence is a history of obsession with judicial deference.”).
188. See Rana, supra note 65.
189. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 193 (2006) (testimony of Jonathan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice).
190. See Benson, supra note 34.
191. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, The Supreme Court’s Immigration Cases from Last Term,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 6, 2009), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/07/the-
supreme-courts-immigration-cases-from-last-term.html (“Last Term, the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided four immigration-related cases. The Court rarely takes so many immigration cases, which
suggests that it—like the general public—views immigration as an important issue. In the four
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more detail, the immigration agency’s role has expanded, and the judicial
role accordingly shrank, just when a strong judicial role has seemed most
needed, as the courts now need to exercise greater oversight over the
immigration agency and review an increasing number of its decisions.192
In sum, these critical developments in the immigration arena, coming just
as the Supreme Court has been reshaping the judicial interpretive role, make
the immigration context a particularly ripe and interesting case study illumi-
nating the stakes involved in the debate over the balance of power between
courts and agencies, and in particular, the implications of a significant
erosion of judicial interpretive authority in favor of increased deference to an
agency in crisis. Analysis of the results of these developments has much to
offer to the study of administrative law generally. Contrary to the path set out
by Mead and Christensen, where the Court appeared to be searching for, and
deferring to, quality agency decision making, the Court has been doing just
the opposite in the immigration realm—deferring to an agency in crisis that is
by nearly any measure failing to fulfill the promise of its interpretive role.
Indeed, the deference regime now emerging in the immigration context
threatens to lead to judicial abdication to an agency unable to fulfill its most
basic functions. These developments merit close examination for the insights
they may offer as to deference doctrine and for how Chevron may play out in
other areas of administrative law.
B. What Immigration Cases Reveal About the Marginalization of the
Judicial Interpretive Role
In its recent administrative law jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has both
restricted and refined the judicial interpretive role under Chevron. The
Court’s most radical revisions have played out in the immigration area,
signaling a “trend toward increasing deference to the BIA [Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals].”193 Again, this is occurring despite the growing indications
that the agency is not responsibly fulfilling its functions. This section
analyzes a set of key immigration cases to show how the court has been
decisions, the Court also addressed some conflicts on immigration law among the circuits.”);
Immigration in the Supreme Court—Oct. 2008 through June 2009, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM
POLICY CENTER (on file with the author) (“Last term, the Supreme Court decided five cases, and
refused to hear another, that will have a substantial impact on the U.S. immigration system. The Court
rarely takes on such a relatively high number of immigration-related cases.”). In the 2009 Term, the
Court appeared to continue this trend of taking up immigration cases. The Court decided Kucana v.
Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act precludes judicial review of Board of Immigration Appeals orders) and Padilla v. Kentucky
559 U.S. 356 (2010) (whether defense lawyers have a duty to advise their clients of the adverse
immigration consequences of a guilty plea to certain drug offenses).
192. See Walker, supra note 9, at 3 (stating “[t]hat the American asylum system has fallen into
disrepute is no longer a significantly contested point of debate.”); see also John S. Kane, Refining
Chevron—Restoring Judicial Review to Protect Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 591
(2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court should reassess how Chevron is applied in immigration cases,
because “the dangerous mood of near complete judicial acquiescence to the BIA must change”).
193. See Farbenblum, supra note 51, at 1096.
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subtly and sometimes dramatically reshaping Chevron in its immigration
jurisprudence.
First, it is important to start out by noting that one of the key cases
signaling a shift in the Court’s immigration-oriented Chevron jurisprudence
is not an immigration case at all—National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, (“Brand X”).194 Yet this case has become
one of the sharpest tools the immigration agency has used to argue for
increased deference to its opinions, regardless of their quality.
Moreover, the true reach of Brand X becomes clear when it is analyzed
alongside more contemporaneous immigration cases. This section argues that
an examination of key immigration cases—wherein the Court has tackled
head-on the question of the judicial interpretive role—reveals that the new
limits on the courts’ role are more evident than if one were to look at Brand X
or its traditionally discussed predecessors without also considering the
Court’s immigration jurisprudence.
To begin with, it is worth elaborating how Brand X opened up a key
opportunity for the immigration agency to step in and demand deference, and
that is precisely what the immigration agency did, despite the chaos the
agency was undergoing. Almost immediately, the immigration agency seized
upon Brand X, seeking deference to its interpretations under Brand X. For
example, the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL)195 has encouraged
government attorneys to utilize Brand X in this manner when litigating its
cases,196 expressly viewing it as a way to bypass judicial constructions
contrary to the agency’s views. Commentators have also noted that the
194. 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (discussing the impact of Brand X on the issue of Chevron’s scope).
Brand X arose in the context of an administrative law landscape already marked by confusion and
controversy over the scope of deference due to agency action following the Supreme Court’s decision
in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (modifying the categories of agency action due
deference under Chevron); see Vermeule, supra note165, at 361 (concluding that “[t]he Court has
inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a no-man’s land”).
195. According to the Department of Justice, OIL “oversees all civil immigration litigation, both
affirmative and defensive, and it is responsible for coordinating national immigration matters before
the federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals.” Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/civil/oil/oil_home.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). Essentially,
OIL works in tandem with the government on immigration cases, and it is “generally viewed as a
good resource for legal analysis of immigration issues because its substantive expertise and its
staffing yield a prompt and serviceable response.” Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr
and Zavydas: Making Policy in the Midst of Litigation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 29 (2002)
[hereinafter Behind the Scenes].
196. See Papu Sandhu, Brand X Application to Immigration Cases, IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL., Apr.
2008, at 1, 17-18, http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/ImmigrationBulletin/April_2008.pdf; see
also Recent Court Decisions, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR 6-7 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for
Immigration Review, Dec. 2007), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/212/include/12-
2007.pdf (reviewing the application of Brand X to a recent BIA decision). For a visual representation
of the relationship between DHS, DOJ, BIA, ICE, and OIL, see EOIR ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, supra
note 21 (providing an organizational chart demonstrating the relationship between the relevant
agencies). See, e.g., Brand X in Immigration Cases, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, http://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/clearinghouse/litigation-issue-pages/brand-x-immigration-
cases (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). See also Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied sub nom. Fernandez v. Mukasey, 555 U.S. 837 (2008) (mem.).
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immigration agency has “appropriated” Brand X to “avoid statutory interpre-
tations” the agency believes is unfavorable.197 In case after case, following
Brand X, courts have deferred to immigration agency interpretations despite
prior conflicting judicial precedents, even when previous courts had not
explicitly found ambiguities in the governing statute,198 (thereby fulfilling
one of the warnings set forth by scholars discussing the potential impact of
Brand X, who worried that Brand X could lead agencies and courts to
question, and seek alternative interpretations of, prior judicial precedents
where courts had appeared not to have found statutory ambiguities).199 The
court’s role in these immigration cases often appears to have been limited to
simply assessing the outer boundaries of the agency’s interpretation.200
While many agree that Brand X tilts judicial review towards deference
generally, in the immigration context the post-Brand-X “trend toward increas-
ing deference to the BIA” is abundantly clear.201 Looking closely at the
Court’s immigration jurisprudence also provides clearer answers to the
questions still considered to be left open after Brand X in non-immigration
administrative-law arenas: that is, questions about precisely when deference
is triggered, how far the tilt towards deference has gone, and how much of an
active role the courts can still play in terms of interpretation of the statutory
terms in Chevron Step One given the emphasis towards deference.202
A group of key immigration cases issued around the time of Brand X show
that the Court has altered and cut back the judicial role more than is widely
recognized.203 These immigration cases show that if the courts identify an
197. Weiss, supra note 35, at 891-92.
198. See id. at 892-93; see also Fernandez, 502 F.3d at 347-48 (deferring to BIA interpretation
under Brand X despite prior contrary Fourth Circuit precedent interpreting the Immigration and
Nationality Act); Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying
Brand X and deferring to a new agency interpretation even though the conflicting judicial opinion
came from the Supreme Court); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2008) (deferring to agency
interpretation under Brand X although contrary to prior Seventh Circuit interpretations).
199. Richard Murphy, The Brand X Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1247, 1251 (“Brand X
suggests a broad principle: Where a politically accountable body uses transparent, deliberative means
to adopt a reasonable interpretation of a law it administers, the courts should defer to this
interpretation, regardless of whether it contradicts judicial precedent.”); Todd S. Aagaard, Factual
Premises of Statutory Interpretation in Agency Review Cases, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 366, 405 (2009)
(“Applying the Brand X principle to premise facts yields the conclusions that agencies have the
authority to reconsider prior judicial statutory interpretations that rest on factual premises, and that
courts must treat agency determinations of premise facts deferentially, even when prior judicial
precedent relied on contrary findings or assumptions.”); contra Doug Geyser, Courts Still Say What
the Law Is: Explaining the Functions of the Judiciary and Agencies After Brand X, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 2129, 2167 (2006) (“[C]ourt-agency relationship and the functions of each body illustrate how
courts retain their traditional role of “saying what the law is” even after Brand X.”)
200. See, e.g., Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2006).
201. Farbenblum, supra note 51, 1096.
202. See generally Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 11 (discussing contemporary Chevron
debates).
203. Since 2001, the Court has considered a number of immigration cases. However, in this
analysis I have chosen to focus on the cases that are most relevant to the Court’s Chevron analysis and
the mainstreaming of immigration law. The other immigration cases that I did not include in this
analysis include: Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (reversing BIA interpretation
of “aggravated felony”—no deference); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (affirming BIA—no
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ambiguity or legal error in Step One of the Chevron analysis, the courts must
then withdraw from any further exercise of their interpretive role—that is, the
courts must step back from construing the statutory terms any further,
allowing the agency the first crack at interpreting the statute, with the courts
then limited to determining whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.
1. A Far From Ordinary “Remand Rule”
The first key immigration case that bears analyzing is INS v. Ventura.204
Ventura is a brief, rather simple decision with broad implications. In Ventura,
the Supreme Court summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in an
asylum case. When the case was before the Ninth Circuit, the circuit court
construed the significance of a factual issue in an asylum case—whether
country conditions had changed to the point that a true fear of persecution no
longer existed. Rather than remand to the BIA to consider this claim, the
circuit court noted that the Immigration Judge originally hearing the case had
held that the country conditions had not changed, and the circuit court,
relying on the Immigration Judge’s analysis, thus found that country condi-
tions had not sufficiently changed, ruling in Ventura’s favor.205 This rather
unlikely vehicle for deference analysis then proceeded to the Supreme Court.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court invoked what it
called “the ordinary remand rule,” saying that a court could not substitute a
judicial decision for a matter that Congress had placed in agency hands. The
review—no deference or Chevron analysis); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007)
(supporting BIA—no review—no deference or Chevron analysis); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47
(2006) (reversing and remanding whether offense was “aggravated felony”—no deference); Fernandez-
Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006) (affirming INS—retroactivity case—no deference); Jama v.
ICE, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) (court deferred to executive on a matter of foreign policy on the issue of
deportation of an alien to an objecting nation with no mention of Chevron deference); Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (reversing and remanding whether offense was “aggravated felony”—no
deference); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (affirming INS—no review—no mention of
Chevron deference); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (deference to Congress on
constitutional challenge to immigration law—no mention of Chevron deference); Calcano-Martinez
v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001) (affirming Court of Appeals—no review—statutory interpretation
only—no mention of Chevron deference). Cases not directly relevant to immigration law for the
purposes of this analysis include Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010) (no review—medical
negligence claim by survivors of immigration detainee—no mention of Chevron deference); Padilla
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (no review—sufficiency of counsel case—no mention of Chevron
deference); Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (no review—criminal case—no
mention of Chevron deference); Mohawk Industries Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (no
review—employment dispute—no mention of Chevron deference); Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85 (2007) (no review—criminal drug possession case—no mention of Chevron deference);
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) (no review—challenging a search warrant—no mention of
Chevron deference); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (no
review—jurisdiction case, held in favor of AG—no mention of Chevron deference); Lopez v.
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (reversed & remanded: whether offense was “aggravated felony”—no
deference). This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to explain how I chose the subset of
immigration cases most relevant to my analysis.
204. 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (clarifying and invoking the “ordinary remand rule” directing courts to
refrain from making judicial judgments and remand to the agency on matters “that statutes place
primarily in agency hands”).
205. Id. at 17-18.
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Court then held that this factual issue was just such a decision, and that the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation. The Court thus remanded the issue so
that the agency could address the significance of the facts in the first instance
in light of its own expertise.206 In other words, the agency would get the first
crack at resolving the issue with the courts’ role limited to reviewing the
boundaries of the agency’s determination, if appealed. The Court explicitly
stated that an appellate court cannot “intrude upon the domain which
Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency” and that “[a]
court of appeals ‘is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo enquiry
into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on
such an inquiry.’”207
After Ventura, some commentators assumed that the Court was merely
saying that courts should send back to the agency unresolved factual issues.
Under this reading, Ventura appeared to do nothing to disturb the common
assumption that courts could still resolve interpretation issues, that is,
construe the meaning of statutory terms, in the first instance, without
necessarily having to remand.208 Notably, despite the escalating chaos at the
immigration agency (which was reflected in Ventura itself, in that the BIA
had failed to consider the finding at issue made by the Immigration Judge) the
Court made no mention of the agency’s ability to fulfill its interpretive role or
properly bring its expertise to bear on the issue at hand.209
However, two other key immigration cases issued shortly thereafter
demonstrate that the Court actually went further in Ventura, significantly
tilting deference toward the agency. First, in early 2006, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Gonzales v. Thomas,210 just eight months after Brand X.
The Thomas case concerned another Ninth Circuit asylum decision which
had come out just weeks before Brand X.211 Thomas is instructive because
here again the Court took an innocuous-looking case and issued a brief,
seemingly simple decision, yet in doing so subtly and significantly expanded
the agency’s domain.
Thomas revolved around how to apply the standard whereby individuals
need to show that they have been persecuted due to their membership in a
particular social group to qualify for asylum under the asylum statute.212 The
206. Id. at 16.
207. Id. at 16 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).
208. The Court’s “ordinary rule is to remand to give ‘the BIA the opportunity to address the
matter in the first instance in light of its own experience.’” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517
(2009) (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002); id. at 523 (“‘[T]he proper course, except in
rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.’”) (quoting
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006)).
209. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17.
210. 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (applying the Ventura remand rule and determining that the agency, not
courts, should decide whether the facts as found fell within a statutory term).
211. Id. at 184.
212. Id. at 186.
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Ninth Circuit interpreted the language of the asylum statute to determine
whether a family could qualify as a particular social group for the purposes of
qualifying for asylum—that is, the Ninth Circuit was defining the term
“family” as a general matter, not whether the facts showed that the particular
family in question in the case before them qualified for asylum. Such an
analysis would appear to be a classic statutory interpretation question for the
federal courts to review under Chevron. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit sought to
reconcile conflicting inter- and intra-circuit precedents on whether the term
“social group” in the governing statute included or could include families. In
doing so, the Ninth Circuit believed it was simply construing a statutory term
as many of its sister courts had done before. In fact, taking care to not
overstep its boundaries after Ventura, after determining in Thomas that a
family could constitute a “social group,” the Ninth Circuit actually remanded
the case back to the BIA for the agency to determine whether the family at
issue fell within a social group consisting of a family.213
However, yet again, when the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court
summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit. This time, the Court somewhat
sidestepped the interpretive issue by reframing the question as a “matter that
require[d] determining the facts and deciding whether the facts as found fall
within a statutory term.”214 On that basis, the Court invoked the Ventura
“ordinary remand” rule and remanded the case back to the agency.
The Thomas case, together with Ventura, thus further elided the boundaries
between the courts’ and the agency’s interpretative roles as the Court treated
a statutory interpretive issue as more like a factual one that had to go first to
the agency under Ventura and Chevron. In doing so, the Court subtly and
significantly expanded the tilt towards agency deference.
Ventura and Thomas alone might be dismissed as immigration cases where
interpretive lines became slightly fuzzy or perhaps as cases where move-
ments away from strict Chevron divides can be laid at the feet of the “rogue”
Ninth Circuit. However, when these cases are viewed in combination with
the next key Supreme Court immigration case—Negusie v. Holder215—the
shift away from a strong judicial role becomes crystal clear.
2. Collapsing the Judicial Role
In Negusie v. Holder,216 a 2009 asylum case, the Court’s Chevron tilt
toward the agency sharpened even further. The issue presented in Negusie
was how to interpret the “persecutor bar” in the asylum statute, which bars a
213. Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004).
214. Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006).
215. 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
216. Id. (finding that since the agency had committed a legal error in its statutory interpretation, it
had therefore not yet exercised its Chevron discretion, and remanding to the agency to allow it to
exercise this interpretive authority in the first instance).
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person from receiving a grant of asylum if the person had participated in the
persecution of others.217
On the surface, this question seemed ripe for judicial interpretation. When
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Negusie, Justice Stevens, the author
of Cardoza-Fonseca, wrote in dissent that “[t]he narrow question of statutory
construction presented by this case is whether the so-called ‘persecutor bar’
disqualifies from asylum or withholding of removal an alien whose conduct
was coerced or otherwise the product of duress. If the answer to that question
is ‘no,’ courts should defer to the Attorney General’s evaluation of particular
circumstances that may or may not establish duress or coercion in individual
cases.”218 He reiterated, “[b]ut the threshold question the Court addresses
today is a ‘pure question of statutory construction for the courts to de-
cide.’”219
Instead, the majority of the Court decided that the immigration agency and
the Fifth Circuit had legally erred by misapplying agency and Supreme Court
precedent on a similar issue to resolve the statutory interpretation issues at
hand. The Court invoked Brand X to say that the interpretation of the statute
was here a gap-filling issue for the agency, stating that the agency should thus
take the first crack at interpretation. Significantly, the Court once again
invoked the ordinary remand rule from Ventura, and invoked Thomas to
further support the view that it was the agency’s role to construe the meaning
of the persecutor bar in the statute in the first instance. The Court thus tilted
deference precepts further towards the agency in a series of steps: first, the
Court noted that it was “well settled that ‘principles of Chevron deference are
applicable to this statutory scheme.’”220 Then, the Court cited Brand X for
the proposition that ambiguities in statutes are within the agency’s jurisdic-
tion to administer.221
Crucially, the Court refused to interpret the statutory language itself or
even to outline the boundaries of any ambiguity in the terms of the statute,
but instead limited itself to simply identifying a legal error and then sending
the case back for agency interpretation—in doing so, severely restricting the
judicial interpretive role. The Court collated language from Chevron, Ven-
tura, and Thomas to state that “when statutes place an issue ‘primarily in
agency hands’ courts should remand back to the agency under the Ventura
‘ordinary remand’ rule,” and that under Thomas, courts should do so in order
to give the agency “the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance
in light of its own experience.”222
Negusie arguably went further than the prior combination of Brand X,
217. Id. at 516.
218. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
219. Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
220. Id. at 516 (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 523.
222. Farbenblum, supra note 51, at 1092.
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Ventura, and Thomas, and carved out a new, even more restricted judicial
role. Rather than interpreting a term of pure statutory construction, as Justice
Stevens urged,223 and in doing so letting the agency determine how to apply
it, the Court did something more radical. The majority not only refused to
interpret the statutory language itself, or to even outline the ambiguities in the
statute, if any, but the Court also further restrained itself to simply identifying
a legal error and then sending the case back to the agency to interpret and
apply the statute.224
Together, Brand X, Ventura, Thomas, and Negusie demonstrate that the
battleground has shifted from the question of how courts should interpret the
language of a statute to the question of precisely when deference should be
granted. The interpretive focus has decisively moved from the courts and
towards the agency. The courts’ role appears to have become largely an
error-checking one, wherein the courts’primary and overarching responsibili-
ties have collapsed to merely assessing the reasonableness of agency action,
as opposed to the courts’ taking an active role in statutory interpretation. As
some legal scholars had predicted, these decisions indicate that, at least in the
immigration arena, Chevron’s two steps have largely collapsed into a single
step, wherein the court’s primary and overarching role is largely limited to
error-checking or assessing the reasonableness of agency action, rather than
construing statutory terms.225
3. Furthering Chevron’s Collapse into a Single Step
The most recent round of Supreme Court immigration and non-
immigration administrative law decisions provides further evidence indicat-
ing that the Court has shifted the role of the courts in judicial review of
agency action, at least in the immigration context. The Court’s recent
immigration jurisprudence is in flux as this Article goes to press. Therefore,
in the following section, I can provide only preliminary analyses of recently
issued cases. Most notably, consider Judulang v. Holder,226 in which the
Court decided that the immigration agency’s actions were “arbitrary and
capricious” and thus struck down the agency’s policy for applying § 212(c) in
deportation cases. The Court in Judulang acknowledged that “[a]gencies, the
BIA among them, have expertise and experience in administering their
statutes that no court can properly ignore.”227 But the Court then went on to
find that “[t]he BIA has flunked that test here. By hinging a deportable alien’s
eligibility for discretionary relief on the chance correspondence between
statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this
223. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 528 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
224. Id.
225. See generally Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 11.
226. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
227. Id. at 483.
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country—the BIA has failed to exercise its discretion in a reasoned man-
ner.”228
Importantly, in the Judulang case, despite the Solicitor General asking the
Court to review the case under Chevron’s Step Two,229 the Court instead
rested its analysis on the APA, but noted that its analysis would be the same
under Chevron.230 The Court justified this approach by stating that “[w]ere
we to [review the case based on Chevron instead of the APA], our analysis
would be the same, because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an
agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary and capricious in substance.’” The Court
thus reviewed the agency’s actions through a single step of arbitrary and
capricious review. In other words, the Court appeared to skip Chevron’s first
step, declining to explicitly rule on whether the statute was ambiguous or on
the scope of any ambiguity. Other scholars agree with this interpretation of
Judulang—noting, for instance, that “[i]nitially the Supreme Court declined
the government’s suggestion to review the BIA’s decision under the Chevron
two-step analysis and instead applied the APA’s ‘arbitrary [or] capricious
standard.’”231 In doing so, the Court carved out a narrow role for itself,
stating that its scope of review under the APA “is ‘narrow’; as we have often
recognized, ‘a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’ . . .
But courts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”232
In Judulang then, the Court seemed to use the single-inquiry arbitrary and
capricious standard while also recognizing the failures of the immigration
agency, stating “[w]e hold that the BIA’s approach is arbitrary and capricious.
The legal background of this case is complex, but the principle deciding our
decision is anything but. When an administrative agency sets policy, it must
provide a reasoned explanation for its action. That is not a high bar, but it is
an unwavering one. Here the BIA has failed to meet it.”233 Indeed, the Court
criticized the Board methodology as one that “turns deportation decisions
into a ‘sport of chance’—exactly what the arbitrary and capricious standard
was designed to prevent.”234 Again, in Judulang the Court appears to be
continuing to move in the direction of gradual acceptance of the idea that
“‘arbitrary and capricious’ review is the same as Chevron review.”235 Hence,
although the Court overturned the immigration agency’s actual decision in
Judulang, the Judulang precedent serves to potentially expand the immigra-
228. Id. at 484.
229. Id. at 483 n.7.
230. Id.
231. U.S. Department of Justice, Supreme Court Soundly Rejects BIA’s Comparability Grounds
Approach to Adjudicating s212(c) Waivers, Vol. 15, No. 12 IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL. (Dec. 2011).
232. 132 S. Ct. at 483-84 (citations omitted).
233. Id. at 456.
234. Id. at 484.
235. Bill Araiza, More News from the World of Chevron, PRAWFSBLOG (May 22, 2012, 4:16 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/05/index.html.
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tion agency’s scope of authority in future cases by limiting the role of courts
to reviewing agency decisions using the arbitrary and capricious standard,
and thereby restricting the courts’ authority to limit agency decision making
based on statutory interpretation under Chevron’s Step One.
Significantly, the Court in Judulang did not focus on the disarray at the
agency, other than to note that the Attorney General had provided mixed
signals to the agency.236 The Court overturned the BIA’s decision in Judu-
lang because of the agency’s failure to render a defensible decision, stating
that it could not find a reason for the agency’s decision and that the rule the
BIA had proffered was “unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the
immigration laws.”237 Thus, it seems that the Court is still focusing on the
agency’s decisions, or the individual decisions it sees, without discussing the
agency’s increasing state of disarray or without taking note of the context in
which such indefensible decisions are arising.
Judulang does, however, offer a glimmer of hope that the Court might
soon begin looking more closely at the agency’s procedures and level of
functioning. The fact that the Court acknowledged mixed signals at the
agency and that the agency had failed to provide a reasoned decision may
indicate that the Court may be more willing to step in to address the endemic
problems at the agency if it is presented with other, similarly poorly reasoned
decisions. If the Court were to take on such an increased or active role,
perhaps some of the poor decision making, mixed messages, and overall
chaos at the agency may be lessened if the agency heeds a future Court’s
pushes for reform.
On balance, however, the Judulang case provides additional evidence that
the Court is collapsing Chevron’s two steps, at least in the immigration
realm.238 Again, the Judulang Court specifically adopted a single-step
arbitrary and capricious standard, despite requests that it review the case
under the Chevron standard.239 It is worth watching the next wave of
immigration cases that reach the Court, both to see if the Court begins to
delve deeper into the disarray at the agency, and whether it chooses to adopt a
single-step or two-step inquiry.
Moreover, scholars have suggested that other recent non-immigration
decisions similarly indicate that the Court may be collapsing Chevron’s two
steps into a single “arbitrary and capricious” inquiry.240 Thus, the new
236. 132 S. Ct. 476, 489.
237. Id. at 490.
238. For another recent immigration case in which the Court arguably appears to have skipped
the first Chevron step of inquiring as to whether there is ambiguity in the statute, see Holder v.
Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012) (consolidated cases). The Court deferred to the BIA in
Martinez Gutierrez and explicitly applied Chevron. In doing so, the Court stated that the Board’s
position “prevails if it is a reasonable construction of the statute . . . .” Id. at 2017.
239. 132 S. Ct. at 490.
240. See Araiza, supra note 235 (discussing Astrue v. Capato ex rel B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021
(2012), and Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011)).
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deference framework applied to the immigration arena through Brand X,
Ventura, Thomas, and Negusie appears alive and well in the Court’s jurispru-
dence.
Furthermore, the Court’s recent cases suggest that the Court may be
moving toward reviewing immigration cases under a general administrative
law framework, moving away from its traditional treatment of immigration
law as an “exceptional” area of law wherein the usual administrative law
rules were often overridden by constitutional concerns.
C. Implications for Non-Immigration Administrative Law
Throughout this article, I have suggested that the developments currently
playing out with respect to deference jurisprudence in the immigration arena
may have implications for non-immigration administrative law cases. I do
not mean to argue that this is necessarily the case. Rather, I mean to raise this
as a question deserving greater scholarly attention. At the very least, it seems
clear that administrative law scholars should further study the developments
currently taking place in the immigration realm. As I have noted above,
immigration appeals now make up the vast majority of the administrative law
cases in the federal appeals courts.241 Considering the importance of immigra-
tion cases to the recent administrative law dockets of the federal courts, it
would be surprising if the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding
deference within the immigration context had no impact on non-immigration
administrative law cases. And, indeed, there is some evidence that courts are
citing the precedents developed in immigration cases in non-immigration
decisions.242
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent immigration cases have been
noteworthy in another respect. Recent immigration cases not involving
Chevron appear to have been decided under straightforward administrative
law principles, suggesting that the Court may be moving away from its
past “immigration exceptionalism” and instead mainstreaming immigra-
tion cases into a general administrative law framework. In this light, cases
such as Arizona v. United States,243 Vartelas v. Holder,244 and Kawashima v.
241. See COMMERCIAL & FED. LITIGATION SECTION, supra note 34, at 8; Family, supra note 53, at
583; Rana, supra note 65, at 854 n.137 (noting that cases skyrocketed from 1642 in 2001 to an
astonishing 8750 in 2004).
242. See, e.g., W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 530 F.3d 1186, 1201 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Gonzales v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 508 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2007)) (energy case citing
immigration case); Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d
253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000), in discussion of the application of deference to the Bureau of Prisons on the
issue of time off for good behavior); Fort Independence Indian Cmty. v. California, 679 F. Supp. 2d
1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009))
(Native American/Gaming case citing immigration case regarding Chevron and Skidmore deference).
243. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
244. 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012) (applying the standard test for retroactive application of new laws
and finding for Vartelas).
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Holder,245 have attracted attention because the Court did not invoke constitu-
tional principles as it might have done in earlier eras.246
Consequently, these cases could portend the softening of “immigration
exceptionalism.”247 To the extent this is occurring, the recent mainstreaming
of immigration law would not be unprecedented. Scholars have argued that a
similar dynamic has been occurring in the area of taxation.248 Prior to the
recent case of Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
States,249 many tax scholars had argued that deference operated differently in
the tax context than in other areas of administrative law, suggesting the prior
existence of a form of “tax exceptionalism” similar to “immigration excep-
tionalism.”250 However, the Supreme Court in the Mayo case decisively
245. 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012), which has been described as “a run-of-the-mill statutory interpreta-
tion case.” Johnson, supra note 191.
246. Johnson, supra note 191.
247. One aspect of the prior practice of immigration exceptionalism is the notion that immigra-
tion differs from many other administrative law areas because of its implications for foreign affairs.
The Supreme Court has often reiterated that “[j]udicial deference in the immigration context is of
special importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that
implicate questions of foreign relations.’ . . . [and] ‘The judiciary is not well-positioned to shoulder
primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such diplomatic repercus-
sions.’” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,
425 (1999); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 100 (1988)); see also Chin, supra note 187, at 23 (“[T]he
modern Court has frequently stated that ‘[o]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977)); Cox, supra note 60, at 1671 (2006) (“The history of immigration jurisprudence is a
history of obsession with judicial deference.”). In my view, this is yet one more reason our
balance-of-powers framework suggests that the judicial role in immigration cases should be stronger,
rather than weaker. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 153, at 1450 (“Congress should not have
unfettered discretion to tinker with the procedures for lawmaking, as the Court has from time to time
recognized. Specifically, Congress should not have unlimited authority to invent procedures for
administrative lawmaking that promote less accountability and tolerate more arbitrariness than we
have come to accept”). While the Executive Branch might face international repercussions for its
decisions, the Executive Branch can disclaim responsibility for judicial decisions in the domestic
realm, especially as immigration cases generally turn on U.S. law, not foreign law, another argument
for the continued application of the Chevron framework in immigration cases, and for a stronger
judicial role. See generally Bradley, supra note 183, at 673-74 (“[T]he Chevron doctrine appears to be
well-entrenched in in the Supreme Court . . . . Second, regardless of whether the criticisms of
Chevron have force as a general matter, they have less force in the context of foreign affairs law—an
area characterized long before Chevron by exceedingly broad executive branch power and sweeping
deference by the courts. Given this history, application of the Chevron perspective to foreign affairs
law poses substantially less danger of centralizing power in the executive branch that does applying it
to other areas of law [and] . . . [t]here are a number of ways in which the Chevron perspective might
offer greater benefits in foreign affairs that in other areas of law. Part of its value in foreign affairs is
law comes simply in providing a framework for understanding and controlling deference in what is
otherwise a very amorphous area.”). In any case, in practice, courts generally defer to the immigration
agency’s interpretation, at best finding international norms persuasive rather than binding. See
Farbenblum, supra note 51.
248. See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: Mayo’s Unanswered Questions, 130 TAX NOTES
1118 (2011) (“The Court in Mayo eliminated any sense of tax exceptionalism by refusing to dis-
tinguish between different types of regulations, whether legislative or interpretive, in deciding what
level of deference to apply. . . .”).
249. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
250. See, e.g., Kristin Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1559-63, 1600 (2006) (describing the debate between tax scholars
who argued that deference operated differently in the tax context as compared to other areas of
administrative law and the tax scholars who argued against this ‘tax exceptionalism’ position).
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rejected the arguments for “tax exceptionalism”—thereby mainstreaming tax
law into the broader administrative law rubric.251 If the Supreme Court is
similarly in the process of decisively ending immigration exceptionalism,
then the Court’s recent immigration decisions regarding deference may lead
to an accompanying reformulation of deference doctrine in non-immigration
administrative law cases.
Thus, arguably, the deference battleground has now shifted from the
question of how courts should interpret the language of a statute to the
question of precisely when deference should be granted. At least in the im-
migration context, interpretive power has shifted from the courts to the
agency. This shift is especially troubling because many of these decisions
granted deference, sometimes even approvingly,252 to an immigration agency
that was rapidly falling into crisis. An important question for administrative
law scholars is whether immigration administration may be the canary in the
coal mine showing that the Court’s recent Chevron jurisprudence could be
leading to dangerous ground for administrative law generally.
In this article, I take no position on the larger problem of how deference
doctrines should apply with respect to well-functioning agencies. Instead, I
have focused on the harms that can result from limiting the role of the courts
with respect to failing agencies, following my argument in Part I that the
immigration agency should be considered such a failing agency. It is one
thing to maintain that the courts should defer to agencies either when: (a) the
agencies render well-thought-out decisions with significant persuasive value
on the merits, or (b) the agencies exercise their decision making authority
through the use of procedures designed to ensure quality. It is quite another
thing for the courts to be forced to defer to an agency—like the immigration
agency—that is failing to either reach persuasive decisions or to make
decisions through the use of procedures designed to ensure quality decision
making. To the extent the courts are forced to defer to failing agencies,253 we
risk an outcome of Chevron without the courts, wherein deference doctrine
results in unchecked agency discretion without opportunity for meaningful
judicial oversight.
251. See Clifford M. Sloan et al., Supreme Court Mayo Foundation Grants Chevron Deference to
Treasury Regulations, TAX EXECUTIVE INSTITUTE (June 7, 2011), http://www.tei.org/news/articles/
Pages/TTE_SPRING11_supreme_courts_mayo_foundation_opinion.aspx (“For decades, many tax-
payers and the government have disagreed over the level of deference that courts should grant to
Treasury. In Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), the
Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts,
unanimously and emphatically resolved that disagreement in favor of the government . . . . The
Supreme Court, absent strong justification, will not treat tax law differently from other areas of
administrative law.”).
252. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516-17 (noting with approval the Immigration Judge’s careful
opinion).
253. Agencies have failed before, most notably the Social Security Administration, see Taylor,
supra note 73, and if the past provides any indication of the future, it is not inconceivable that courts
will once again be forced to deal with failing agencies.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to contribute to the dialogue over whether and in
what contexts Chevron is being redrawn, as well as to offer some suggestions
for how and in what ways the judicial role might be strengthened to fulfill
Chevron’s original promise. This article thus seeks to open a larger debate
into possibilities for resolving the current disarray in both Chevron jurispru-
dence and immigration administration. One way forward could be to
strengthen the judicial role in statutory interpretation, shifting Chevron
jurisprudence once again, yet this time with concrete examples as to what can
happen when deference is given to a failing agency. More simply, the Court
could reassert its insistence that agency decisions receiving deference be
reached in a deliberative way that provides a realistic basis for believing that
the agency explored all viable alternatives. The Court might also return to its
traditional separation between questions of statutory interpretation and
questions of fact, applying the APA’s standard of review to the latter while
retaining the judicial role in saying what the law is in the former. Alterna-
tively, looking deeply at the failures of the immigration agency may spur the
Court to further rethink Chevron, and related assumptions on deferring to
agencies.
As I argued in Part I, the failure of the immigration agency demonstrates
why we need to maintain an interpretative role for the courts at least in
circumstances wherein an agency fails any meaningful test of quality
decision making. Courts simply lack the resources that would be required to
check failing agencies by reviewing every agency decision under an arbitrary
and capricious standard. For courts to be able to successfully function as a
check on failing agencies, the courts must not be forced to defer to the legal
interpretations of these agencies unless the agencies reach their decisions
using quality procedures. The Chevron deference framework is predicated on
notions of agency expertise and accountability. The purposes of the Chevron
framework are thus not furthered by mandating that the courts defer to
agencies even when the agencies clearly fail to either employ expertise or to
act in an accountable fashion.
Imagine if the Supreme Court had called out the failures of the immigra-
tion agency and reached a Mead-like decision concluding that courts need
not defer to the interpretive decisions of the immigration agency until such
decisions were reached through quality procedures. Indeed, there is some
evidence that the threat of judicial review forces agencies to develop better
procedures and clean up their acts.254 Had the Court issued a ruling of this
sort (similar to Mead, directed to the immigration agency or other failing
254. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 24, at 932-33 (stating that data and analysis regarding
agency rulemaking set forth in the article “provides some support for the conclusion that agencies’
use of notice-and-comment rulemaking increased after the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in United
States v. Mead Corporation”); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and
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agencies), the past decade of immigration disasters might have been at least
partially averted. In contrast to what actually happened, wherein the immigra-
tion agency designed practices so as to restrict meaningful judicial review
and agency review, a world in which the Court issued this hypothetical
decision might well have seen the immigration agency revitalize its proce-
dures to ensure quality, as doing so would be a prerequisite for the immigra-
tion agency to receive deference.
Perhaps this hypothetical is something of a pipe dream. But it is likely not
a complete coincidence that the immigration agency fell into chaos just as the
Supreme Court issued a series of decisions guaranteeing that the immigration
agency would still receive deference despite its lack of quality procedures,
and that this occurred during a time—post-September 11 America—when the
agency was focused on deporting as many people as possible.255
Understanding the past decade of the immigration agency’s disasters is
important in its own right, for the many lives affected by its chaos and
increasingly poorly rendered decisions on matters of great importance. Both
administrative law and immigration law scholars should pay greater attention
to this troubling history—asking why the courts were unable to effectively
check the immigration agency as it fell into chaos. Moreover, beyond the
importance of this history for immigration law and policy, administrative law
scholars should study the interactions between the courts and the immigra-
tion agency as a case study of how the Supreme Court’s recent deference
jurisprudence might play out with respect to other failing agencies.
Governance is complex, and regulatory capture or excess politicization
always lurks as a threat to effective regulation. In the American system, the
courts have historically stood as an important check against failures in the
executive branch. The question must now be asked—in light of the Supreme
Court’s recent Chevron jurisprudence, and looking to the case study of the
immigration agency—can the courts still provide a meaningful check on the
possibility of agencies running amok? Or are we headed toward Chevron
without the courts, not just in the immigration context, but in administrative
law generally?
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490-91 (2002) (suggesting that in
the context of legislative rules, judicial review does improve the overall quality of rules).
255. See Rana, supra note 65 (explaining how the agency, after September 11, 2001, adopted
procedures that deliberately and successfully skewed decision making towards deportation).
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